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THE LATER THOUGHT OF PLATO

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C. One is familiar by this time with the distinction drawn by some Platonists between the dialogues written by Plato while he was still under the influence of Socrates, and the later ones alleged to contain the fruits of his own independent thought. Even if, however, we accept this distinction, for me there would still remain a question as to the emancipation of Plato from other thinkers than Socrates.

A. None, however, with whom he was in such direct relation as with Socrates?

C. Except the Pythagoreans whom he may have met in Sicily. But what I mean is this, that Plato seems to have come under the influence of various schools of thought at different times, of Heraclitus manifestly and probably later the Eleatics, and then the Pythagoreans. In fact Aristotle says as much. Whether he accepted the doctrines of Democritus is an obscure question, but the particles of which the physical elements are composed according to the *Timaeus* are comparable to the atoms of Democritus so far as they describe the structure of the physical universe—I say nothing of differences between the two thinkers as to its origin.

A. But in that case you have also to take into account a similar pilgrimage of the soul in the case of Socrates. According to the *Apology*, he began by being interested in physical questions, and gave them up for enquiries into human nature, while Plato seems to have got more and more absorbed in physical science and mathematics.

C. That antithesis makes me wonder whether it was appropriate for Plato to make Socrates sponsor, as he does in the *Republic*, a scheme of higher education based largely on mathematics and physical science—in fact the scheme that Plato seems to have worked out in the Academy years after the death of Socrates.

A. Well, perhaps we might concede that Socrates and Plato were agreed in wanting to find a way out from the sceptical side of Heraclitus' doctrines, which made knowledge impossible, if there was nothing but a perpetual *devenir*, and further that as at least one entity standing outside the flux, they affirmed the reality of the human soul.

C. It is curious, by the way, that critics' belief of the flux seems to have ignored the Heraclitean *logos*. There still remains one doctrine, in which Socrates seems to have had contacts with other schools of thought, if as seems likely he believed in the doctrine of *anamnesis*, which seems to be required for the Phaedo and the Meno; for *anamnesis* is connected with Pythagoreanism.

A. You would agree, however, that there was one doctrine that neither Socrates nor Plato accepted.

C. You mean the position of the Sophists.

A. Especially that of Protagoras, which transferred to the human mind some of the characteristics of Heraclitus' realm of becoming. It is clear, I think, that both Socrates and Plato were influenced by the Eleatics in their strong assertion of a realm of being over against the Heraclitean flux, but that as against the Eleatics Socrates in trying to account for the manifold in becoming broke up *ousia* into a plurality of "essences." In fact we might perhaps take a hint from Aristotle, who says that Socrates was interested in logical problems, particularly that of definition (which seeks to get at the essence of a thing), while realizing that Socrates did not recognize that they were logical problems, but thought of them in terms of ontology.

C. Yes, as I see it, Socrates was struck by one feature of the *devenir*, that it was so frequently a passing from one opposite to another, from hot to cold, dry to moist, light to darkness—and posited an essential hot or cold, dry or moist. So far as there was a logical side to this, Socrates' method was a logical one, but I doubt whether logic played more than a limited part in enabling men's minds to see more in the world of becoming than a mere flux.

A. True they had gone a step farther in describing the flux in general terms as "kinesis," or in the widest sense "process," but probably you are thinking of the speculations of the other Ionians, of the work of Empedocles, and the progress in astronomy.

C. Yes, of science in general, and you may throw in mathematics, at least geometry, if you like. *Pace* Heraclitus, knowledge of the physical world was accumulating, and it was the accumulation of that organized experience which gave Plato the data for the precise definition of knowledge which he and probably Socrates spent so much time in establishing—just as the work culminating in the Newtonian physics seems to have given Kant the material for

analysing the operations of the understanding, though the motive may have been supplied by Hume, even as it was furnished for Socrates and Plato by the doctrines of Heraclitus and, say, Protagoras.

A. May we not say that apart from geometry and numbers there were two great groups of phenomena, which the Greeks distinguished, (1) the half-physical, half-chemical ones of transformation from contrary to contrary, hot to cold, moist to dry, rare to dense, and (2) movement, especially the movement of the heavenly bodies, over against the "rest" of a central earth, movement by the way being indicated by a term so wide that it covered even the growth of living creatures?

C. Yes, but this distinction had not been made when men accepted the views of Heraclitus and Empedocles, as Socrates described them in the *Theaetetus*; you remember the phrase "Everything that is comes from *kinesis* and motion in space and the mutual mixing of things, and we must not speak of their being but of a perpetual becoming." "It is motion (*kinesis*) that produces being and becoming, 'rest' that brings about not-being and destruction. Heat and fire, the source of other things, are produced by movement in space and friction, and these are kinds of *kinesis*."

A. True, and the transition from this view of things to what we may call the scientific view is made clear in the *Timaeus*. At the fresh start made at c. 17 of the *Timaeus*, when the third "*eidos*," called by various names, is introduced, Timaeus says that they must go back to the nature of the four elements, as people were agreed to call them, before the demiurge dealt with them. At such a stage all that one could say about them was that one was constantly passing into the other, water hardened into earth, rarified into air, air catching fire, and fire passing into air, which again condensed as vapour becomes water. Hence one could not say of any of these phenomena that it was this or that, but only of such a kind, and only "this" or "that" could be applied to the medium, in which these phenomena occurred. Timaeus then goes on to give the scientific account of these processes, so far as they were genuine (for he excluded earth from the series of transformations), based on the theory that each element is composed of particles with a different geometrical form for each element, and that the interactions of the several kinds of particles determine the familiar phenomena. This is the arrangement which Plato summed up by saying that the demiurgos organized the primitive elements by forms and numbers, εἴδεσι καί ἀριθμοῖς, the most definite statement of the *Timaeus* on the structure of the material world, and this work was done prior to the "creation" of the heavens, of which it was apparently a necessary preliminary.

C. While you were speaking a curious thought occurred to me, i.e. that the primitive process of transformation superseded by the scientific account in the *Timaeus* was in a sense retained by Aristotle, for in the *De Generatione*, etc., he certainly discussed the passage from one physical state to its contrary, hot to cold, dry to moist in terms of quality as we should say, and spoke of one "form" replacing another, so that it was Aristotle of all people who held to the notion of forms to explain physical changes, having in fact little choice, since he so persistently rejected anything like atomism.

A. True, but in justice to Aristotle I think we should remember that he invented the notion of the *hypokeimenon*, which is the substratum for the changing forms or qualities, and in a way this is his equivalent of the general *ὑποδοχή*, finally identified with space, of the *Timaeus*; in fact one passage in c. 18 of that dialogue reads almost like a statement of the *hypokeimenon*.

C. Well now, where can we trace the logical process by which the antinomy of the Heraclitean and Eleatic positions, if one may so express it, was resolved or at least modified?

A. If one can bring in Aristotle the answer might be that though he rejected atomism in physics, he did ascribe *ousia* to the concrete individual thing and thus brought a plurality of "reals" into the realm of becoming. His *τόδε τι* is a correction of the statement in the *Timaeus* that in the physical flux you can only speak of things as being of such a kind and not this or that.

C. Yes, that is true enough, but are we not rather proposing to concentrate on Plato? What do you think we can make out of his use of the antithesis between *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*, for they suggest interaction between some sort of entities?

A. Certainly Aristotle put the pair in his list of categories, but in the Platonic dialogues the relation is used conspicuously to illustrate one theory of sensation, as in the *Theaetetus*, where the percipient is passive, and the agent becomes "hot" or "white."

C. Yes, but in the *Sophistes* a fundamental significance is at one point attributed to the relation of action and passivity. If you remember, the materialists are invited to accept the formula that the capacity to act and to be acted on is the mark of the real. The formula is later put hypothetically as passivity (or as we might say affection) and action arising out of a certain potentiality through the two entities meeting.

A. True. I was thinking of the attempt to get round the unconvinced "friends of the ideas" by showing that knowing and being known was a case of action and affection. Anyhow the notion of acting and being acted upon does imply the reciprocal action of finite centres, thus modifying the over-simplified uniformity of Heracliteanism.

C. Further, it leads to these entities having ποιότητες (qualities) and πάθη (affections), which is an advance in logical analysis.

A. Qualities—yes, that reminds me of the great step forward taken in the clearing up of predication in the Sophistes, but perhaps we should defer that for the moment and think of the distinction of quality and quantity, which again is a bit of progress in logic.

C. Quantity—that brings in mathematics, not geometry perhaps, but numbers, and quantity involves measurement, not in the sense of Protagoras, however. Here we shall meet with the Pythagorean influence, I suppose.

A. In that case in which of the dialogues are we to look for it?

C. There is a good deal about the *peras* and the *apeiron*, which are Pythagorean concepts, in the *Philebus*, and the introductory passage throws light on the various physical contraries from a fresh point of view.

A. You mean the use of colder and hotter, moister and drier, as instances of the *apeiron* or indefinite.

C. Yes, but here it is not a case of the one passing into the other, but both being regarded as a case of the more or less, the only passage apparently being from a smaller to a greater degree of hot or cold, dry or moist. This is rather curiously said to exclude a "how much." In virtue of the variety of their degrees hot and cold, etc., are said to be without limit, and their indefinite advance would have been checked if they admitted quantity and τὸ μέτριον. Two reflections occur to me: (1) that the reference to quantity points to a way of getting to *know* certain aspects of the flux, i.e. by measurement in terms of quantity, for "that which is of the nature of the equal or the twofold, in checking the divergence of contraries and making them symmetrical produces number." (2) That if the degree of hot and cold is settled by an influence acting as a *peras*, this tends to regard them quite otherwise than as forms. The flux can be measured.

A. (taking up the text of the *Philebus*). And I think we can go further than—yes, here we are. The combination of the πέρας with the many ἄπειρα is said to be a γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν, a becoming into being through the measures, that were produced along with the limit. This puts the becoming or *devenir* into a new relation with real being. Then follows another mark of the later Plato; he insists that there must be a cause of the blending, which cause is an agent τὸ ποιοῦν, further specified as the demiurgos of all these things. If he had still been at the level of Pythagorean thought, Plato would have been content to leave the limit and the unlimited as ultimate terms, but he has now come to look for an unifying influence in the universe, a creative first cause, one might almost say.

C. And the bare mathematical character of the limit is illustrated somewhat in the different specified milieux, as in sounds, where it

brings melody as the scale, in human nature law and order, and it works again in the tempered seasons of nature. And Plato lengthens out the chain by giving the "cause" of the blending a progenitor in the shape of "*nous*."

A. Yes, but he thinks of "*nous*" as "thought" or intelligence, not as a mind, because he still insists that mind implies a soul and is not independent.

C. Well, I'm not sure that in following up the *Philebus* we haven't strayed a little from our purpose in tracing the development of the thought of the later dialogues on the side of pure logic except in substituting quantity for quality. But at least we have illustrated from the *Philebus* Aristotle's rather cryptic statement about Plato centring on a doctrine of "forms and numbers." How then shall we stick to the logic?

A. Manifestly by keeping mostly to the *Sophistes*, which the scholiasts say is about "being" and is "*logikos*."

C. Of course—the *Sophistes* starts off with an exercise in the art of splitting up a very general class into more and more minute subdivisions till you cannot go any further. The tracking down of the Sophist is the excuse for it in the *Sophistes*, and of course there is a lot of it in the *Politicus*. Really Plato was a little childish, when he had got hold of a new dialectical exercise.

A. Ah, but there is more in it than that. Think how much science owes to classification based on species and genera. And in a way, I would regard it as carrying the doctrine of forms a step further by means of emergent logic. For it is uniformity of type that puts concrete things or creatures into the same genus and pushed still further into the same species. So one kind of form settles down into genus and species.

C. Perhaps, but Plato seemed to regard it as a much more serious business in the *Sophistes* to dispose of the notion of "not being." The commentators are all anxious to point out that he hung back from this in the *Theaetetus*, though invited to face it, because he was reluctant to challenge the great authority of Parmenides—a little bit of literary criticism such as might come from editing *Virgil* or the tragedians.

A. Well, he softened the blow for Parmenides or made it worse, which ever way you look at it, by concluding that in a sense not being is and further that being is not.

C. Yes, without going through the tortuous argument we may say that he discovered that when you said this or that was not being you did not mean that it was not existent, but that it was different or other—still making use apparently of contraries.

A. Well, not altogether, it was not simply that a thing could not be black and white and therefore if black, was not being from the

point of view of white—a thing might differ from another in not sharing in some general pair of qualities at all.

C. In fact, only the totality of real was being and nothing but being, anything within it was at once being and not being, in that it was different from any other "thing."

A. Plato was indeed making an important step in logic, arriving at predication——

C. But still not quite reaching the distinction between and relation of subject and predicate—or perhaps rather substance and attribute.

A. Possibly so far as the latter pair is concerned, though he distinguished explicitly between noun and verb. It seems to me that the Greek trick of using the neuter of the article with an adjective or participle for conveying abstract notions was an isolated achievement, and however convenient arrested the development of logic.

C. Now would you say that the discovery of predication led Plato to drop some of his notions about the forms, at least so far as they related to qualities? I mean that it seems no longer necessary to speak of a thing (if you recognize "things"), partaking of this or that form, if you can speak of it having this or that quality.

A. I agree that if you have reached the distinction between substance and attribute (which implies more metaphysics than subject and predicate), you have less need of "forms," for you have then planted something of timeless reality in the flux of becoming; and Plato does in the later dialogues speak much less about participation. If, however, you are on the look-out for signs of a revision of the doctrine of forms, it seems to me that you have something much more to your purpose in that part of the long discussion in the *Sophistes* where he turns his attention, led by the windings of the argument, to "being" rather than to not being.

C. Ah—you are coming to his detached attitude towards the friends of the "ideas," or forms.

A. That is putting it mildly, since it was owing to an assumed refusal of this school to accept the "action" and "affection" formula, as applying to anything but becoming, that the Eleatic stranger was made to exclaim, "Are we to believe that motion, life, soul, thought have no place in 'Complete Being,' that it neither lives nor thinks, but that solemn and holy, it abides in immobility, without mind?" This sentence seems to me to convey the essential thought of the later Plato that there is motion, life, and thought in the "real," that these properties imply soul, and accordingly that the forms being connected with the impersonal real of the Eleatics by themselves do not cover the whole of the real. As I see it, that was Plato's ultimate contribution to Greek thought.

C. Yes—and soul, life, mind are never spoken of as forms, even

if for no other reason than that they are entities in which literally there is a before and after—that test again pointing to the associating of "forms" with the Eleatics' "real." The case of κινήσις (motion), however, is something of a puzzle, because while it is maintained in this discussion that there could not be life and mind, or if you prefer, thought, without motion, and therefore that it is "real," it is a little later spoken of as one of the five most important "forms."

A. But you will observe that the Eleatic stranger says equally that there cannot be thought if there is not an element of "rest" or stability in real being, thus rejecting both Heraclitean and Eleatic extremes as adequate apart to give a true notion of the real. I think that Plato felt that motion and rest as it were hung together, like the numerous other pairs of contraries, but that his logic had not gone far enough to enable him to think of them as *states* of the real.

C. And so we have the somewhat curious combination of "being," which should be *sui generis*, motion and rest which are states and same and other, which on the whole are relations. I agree that Plato seems a little doubtful of their status, as he calls them now εἴδη and now γένη. Again their community is largely guaranteed by the fact that the other four all share in "being."

A. You might go a little further and wonder why he has added to them no others, and why, e.g., when he found that he had to include "some and other," he did not by parity of reasoning admit "one and many"; I suggest that the answer might be that it was the community of the fundamental "forms" of being, which he was anxious to trace, and that for this purpose he felt that he had enough on hand.

C. But if you call these five forms, they are not such in the same sense as the word is used in the earlier dialogues to denote both qualities and certain concrete existences.

A. Perhaps not, but I do believe that whatever changed in Plato's mind, he stuck to the distinction carefully drawn in so late a dialogue as the *Timaeus* between the kind of being that is uncreated, imperishable, admitting nothing into itself and not issuing forth from itself, unseen and beyond sensation, and the other kind which is perceptible, created, ever in motion, arising in a place and then vanishing therefrom. And that as he did not accept the undifferentiated "one" of the Eleatics, but distinguished a related manifold in the real, he saw the unchanging nature as a system of forms, which accordingly for him showed the *structure* of the real, though its activity might be attributed to soul or mind.

C. Well, perhaps to simplify matters one should not overdo the interpretation of εἶδος as a technical term, least of all when the

two kinds distinguished above and the "container" are all called εἴδη), but treat it as one of a group, including, e.g., γένος, ἀρχαί, στοιχεῖα. I understand that so good a Platonist as Plotinus treated the five as *summa genera*, and I have a feeling that with this penchant for classification that Plato shows in the later dialogues, the advance of logic was bringing him to treat the mass of forms rather as species, which might in turn be grouped in genera.

A. Be it so—and if one were to translate εἴδη as species when it is used of the four main kinds of living creatures in the *Timaeus*, or by some other term in the case of the physical elements, would not Plato tell us that the existence of such types was for him part of a sound conception of real being?

C. I suppose so—by the way, there is not much in the *Sophistes* about the relation of becoming to being, as, e.g., in the *Philebus*.

A. No, from the nature of the case, since here Plato is dealing mainly with being and not-being; there is, however, a passage towards the end of the dialogue, which re-echoes the language of the *Philebus*, saying that mortal animals, plants and bodies in the earth, fusible or otherwise, came into being through a God acting as demiurgos, not merely by the agency of nature but with reason and divine science. This, however, is all by the way, introduced to show the difference between two kinds of creations, divine and human.

C. Good—but any trace of such a doctrine puts the relation of the realm of becoming to that of being on a new footing, and one in which the notion of cause is inevitably introduced—and such causality is quite independent of the forms, which in so far as they are, as you said, connected with the structure or stable aspect of real being, manifestly are not active forces.

A. This brings us back to the *Timaeus*; and there the hints given in the *Philebus*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus* are carried further and the *devenir* is exhibited frankly as a creation. As such it is identified with something concrete, οὐρανός or κόσμος, or whatever it may be called, and its relation to real being is that of the copy or image of a model, and working back from this relation Plato has to call real being no longer τὸ παντελῶς ὄν of the *Sophistes*, but τὸ παντελὲς ζῶον.

C. Yes, a certain violence is done to the habitual statement of the two natures in abstract terms. The suggestion of creation has to be made plausible by pleading that everything must have a cause, and further the term γέγονος is quietly slipped in to denote what has always been τὸ γιγνόμενον. If it had not been Timaeus but another, Socrates might not have allowed him to get away quite so easily with these breathless declarations.

A. No doubt, but as you know well enough, Timaeus does have to come back later to face certain things that he had passed by at

this stage. Again as time is "created" by the demiurgos together with the universe, there could not be any "becoming" prior to the origin of time.

C. Then there is another fundamental innovation in the relation of becoming to being, involved in a vital element in the account of the physical universe contained in the first part of the *Timaeus*, I mean the introduction of the world soul.

A. Yes, I agree that this is not quite the way in which one would expect the contention of the *Sophistes* that "perfect being" must include soul and movement, to be made good. But Plato was insistent that soul was the agent of motion, and the motions of the physical universe therefore could only be caused by a soul.

C. But is that altogether consistent with the statement in the *Timaeus*?—The particular motions of the planets, including the sun are described as part of the work of the demiurgos and they apparently move independently, being identified with divine beings, and the world soul is spoken of as "revolving on itself" as if it were responsible only for the general revolution of the whole sphere.

A. Yes, I agree, and Plotinus later was obviously bothered by great deal of the *Timaeus*, and insisted on retaining the world soul in the ideal world and directing this world without being immanent within it—but I maintain that generally it is the growing association in Plato's mind of soul with movement, made most prominent in the Laws, that goes far to account for the place of the world soul in the world, in order literally to keep it going. But of course one cannot leave the exposition of the origin of the physical world in the earlier part of the *Timaeus* just as it is without going back to the second start, at which we glanced for a particular purpose a little earlier.

C. No, I should think not, for there the notion of becoming in its pristine form breaks in to disturb the harmony. In the earlier part of the dialogue—or dissertation—the realm of becoming is transformed into a concrete reality, with a spherical form, containing motion and at the same time stable elements, the earth, sun, moon, and stars and living creatures, the whole constituting the body of a world soul.

A. But then Timaeus is confronted with the familiar phenomenon of the elements passing into one another—and they are first mentioned almost at the outset—the *devenir* in fact in its most obvious form; so the logical difficulties re-emerge no longer to be met by saying that this particular thing partakes of such and such a form, since he has committed himself to a view that the world of becoming is a copy of a pattern universe. In this plight he invokes a third entity to help him out, the container, or "nurse," or mould (ἐκμαγεῖον)

which seems to sway between Aristotle's "substratum" and bare space, as giving a place or seat for the various phenomena.

C. To me it seems a little like the modern notion of a magnetic or gravitational field, to judge of the account given of its reaction to the actions of the other elements within it in the state of things supposed to exist prior to the intervention of the demiurge.

A. A very interesting comparison that—but otherwise Plato is not of the same mind as our contemporary physicists, for instead of integrating space and time he makes time the creation of the demiurge and space apparently an original something, with which the demiurge was faced.

C. But space is not identical with the so-called errant cause or agency.

A. No, as I take it, that is a name for the unknown agency which causes disorderly motion. But it is significant that now for the first time Plato invokes a third factor to account for the relation of being and becoming, now not thinking of the latter so much as a process in time, but something to be apprehended as occupying space. Hence he attains precision in statement by declaring that we must say that this surface is hot or cold, dry or moist, dense or rare, solid or fluid.

C. All the same the strange thing is that having thus come near to a kind of phenomenalism, he next says that the demiurgos imposed on the crude elements "forms and numbers," and makes Timaeus half unconsciously slip into a discourse about the elements being "bodies," and bodies having three dimensions, all leading up to the several geometrical particles accounting for the elements and their mutual transformations—a complete change into another order of ideas.

A. Well, I should not have been surprised, if you had seen in this the science of chemistry struggling into existence. Short of that, body was already for Plato the subject of solid geometry, and as such had a certain status not easy to adjust with the general notion of becoming. I will, however, offer my suggestion for what it is worth to explain the transition to the second account. Socrates in the *Apology* and Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* criticize Anaxagoras for not making enough use of his discovery of "*Nous*" in the universe, only bringing it in as a *Deus ex machina*, but otherwise accounting for things through what Plato himself called "secondary causes." Now science inevitably follows this latter way, and Plato knew that he could not get away from it, but he was also going to see that *Nous* should not be cheated of its due share. So he introduces *Nous* as the demiurgos or craftsman bringing order out of chaos. "God took over a world that was utterly restless and moving without rhythm and order," as he says, and this was remedied by the intro-

duction of an intelligent soul. Thus Plato also gives expression to his belief in soul as the cause and controller of motion. This of course was quite independent of his doctrine of forms.

C. Then the debt to *Nous* is paid in the first account given in the *Timaeus*. This was not too easy, for although the world is called an animated organism, it is not like finite organisms, it is not subject to growth and decay, it is self-sufficing, and so is not dependent on nourishment from without, and it needs neither organs of sense nor of locomotion. All this has to be accepted and justified, seeing that after all it is the great stellar universe that is being described. So its structure and arrangement have to be shown to be rational, and for this purpose the elements, which are here accepted as stable, have their function. There must be fire, otherwise the universe would not be visible, and solid earth, or it would not be tangible, and the balance of things, interpreted mathematically, require two other elements between them. In shape the whole is a sphere—the most regular and perfect form containing all other figures. This figure, too, was suitable for the unique motion which the whole was to have, i.e. a rotation about its axis, its general position being unchanged. One understands by the way the point of Aristotle's criticism of the "world soul," rather cramped, it would seem, by its body. As there were no organs of sense, there would be no windows for it to look out of, just one recurrent motion to maintain.

A. Yes, but some compensation was given to the soul by the element of myth in this part of the *Timaeus*, as e.g. the elaborate quasi-chemical composition of the world soul, the location within it of the circles of the same and other, the former representing the daily rotation of the universe, the latter marking the orbits of the sun, moon, and planets in their longer pilgrimages. Mythical, too, is the general identification of the stars with gods.

C. The fixed stars yes, but tradition had done it already for the planets, and in fact in what we are told about them there is more science than myth, in the theory of their orbits, the ascription to them of a spiral movement to reconcile their daily movement with the whole sphere and their particular journeys, and the free use of scientific terms to describe their conjunctions and oppositions. All this imports into the first account the reliance on geometry and numbers, which is explicitly avowed in the second. But I still find a certain difficulty in understanding the motive of the elaborate reinstatement of the *devenir*, illustrated from the apparent transformation of the elements, when the sequel to it all was that what Plato had a little earlier called τῶν ὄντων μιμήματα emerge so soon afterwards as visible and tangible bodies with their three dimensions, composed of geometrical particles.

A. Well, you must remember that it was the difficulties felt by

Plato about the process of becoming as illustratedd by the supposed transformation that forced him to postulate the ὑποδοχή or container, ultimately identified with extension or space, and all leading up to the final statement that being, becoming, and space existed before the heaven was formed. Further, he does actually correct himself when he comes to the geometry of the elemental particles, saying that "what was obscurely said earlier must now be stated more definitely, for the four elements all appeared to have their genesis from one to another, but this was not an accurate impression." Then he proceeds to build up their several particles.

For me the transition to science is prepared for by the announcement that the demiurgos imposed on the rudimentary elements "forms and numbers"—a most significant expression. That made science possible; Plato's ἐπιστήμη could only be attained, when the subject-matter could be interpreted in terms of (geometrical) forms and numbers. As he became more and more interested in science, "forms and numbers" came to be the most important εἴδη, apart from the *summa genera* of the *Sophistes*, most important certainly for interpreting the sensible world. It is worth remembering, too, that when he was speaking of the things that passed in and out of the receptacle, he said they were representations of τὰ ὄντα, from which they were stamped in a wondrous fashion, to which he will recur, meaning no doubt the geometrical forms of the particles. Hence Aristotle's otherwise puzzling reference to the development of Plato's doctrine of forms, so different from what we read in the earlier dialogues. And as for the emergence of χώρα as space, surely it is still wanted for the particles, into which the elements were resolved. What are their surfaces and figures but boundaries of so much space?

C. And number comes in because Plato has realized that matter, or rather as he would say body is discrete; and number has to measure the relations of lines, angles, triangles, cubes, pyramids, etc. There is also a free use of number in what you call the mythical part, as e.g. the elaborate harmonical progression prescribed for the mixture of the elements of the world soul, and corresponding incidentally to the supposed distances of the seven "planets" from the earth. Further, the idea of proportion is invoked to account for the need of another element between fire and earth, and one would have been enough if the body of the world had been flat, but as it has depth two were required.

A. I agree that forms and numbers came also into the opening part of the Dialogue, wherein myth and science meet, and of course in that part Plato has it constantly in mind to show that in his creative work the God achieved the beautiful and the good, which were "forms" of an earlier order. The second account, however, is

more consistently scientific, for after the analysis of the elements he gives some attention to motion and rest, the latter being associated with uniformity and equality, and the former being due to a disturbance of these conditions. Further, the incessant contacts and collisions of the elements are caused by the rotation of the universe, which compresses them together, not allowing any empty space, so that the elements composed of finer particles find their way into the interstices of the grosser elements. Again, he recognizes that each element has its proper place by reason of its greater or less mobility. In all this science I do not find any reference to soul as the unique cause of motion—not that Plato really overlooked it.

C. Manifestly not, when one thinks of the myth in the *Politicus*, wherein Plato fancies the plight of a universe of which God has ceased to guide the movements. Generally in the *Timaeus* there is a combination of design with the use of mechanical instruments.

Our human clay is liable to old age and death, when the edges of its particles are worn down by use. Perhaps, however, we need not go on to that part of the dialogue which deals with the human soul and body.

A. No, for Plato still clings to that old-fashioned psychology of the Republic, which now almost seems to have given birth to three separate souls.

We have followed the *Dialogue* far enough to see a transformation of "*le devenir*" into a universe or system, made intelligible by the imposition of forms and numbers and controlled by a world soul. In fact the *Timaeus* is like a development of the theory of the *Philebus* about the limit and the unlimited. There the limit was involved in the relation of number to number, measure to measure. It produced law and arrangement, and brought becoming to being.

C. Without going further into these questions, I should like to ask you one thing—do you identify the demiurgos with any of the other, shall we say, symbolic figures in the dialogues, e.g., with the form of the good?

A. Certainly not, the "form of the good" belongs to the time when Plato still thought of the real in terms of impersonal being, while the demiurgos marks the stage reached in the *Sophistes*, at which soul, life, and thought are part of perfect being. Not that I identify the demiurgos with *Nous*, because that could never in Plato's belief exist except in soul, but I certainly think that he meant to convey that the demiurgos worked through *Nous*. But I am averse generally from the fanciful identification of these shadowy beings in the dialogues. It is like trying to build a theology out of scattered and perhaps irrelevant passages in the New Testament. Just keep to the *Timaeus* itself. There are the two great ζῶα, the demiurgos,

the world soul, time the moving image of eternity, the errant cause, the container or otherwise the mould, the elemental particles of various figures, the picture of the infant soul confronted with the world of sense, was there ever such a wealth of the wonders of the creative imagination seen in any of the books of the ancients or again in modern times?

BISHOP BUTLER'S REFUTATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM[1]

REGINALD JACKSON

To the question 'Why do you try to realize *this*?' your answer may be 'Because I desire *that* and I think that the realization of *this* would involve the realization of *that*.' Or your answer may be 'Because I desire *this*.' If 'Why?' is interpreted as 'Desiring what?' the question 'Why do you *desire* this?' is improper. The word 'desire' is, however, frequently used in such a way as to countenance the impropriety. It is so used not only when what is pursued only as a means is said to be desired, but also when a desire for what possesses one character is said to be a desire for what possesses a a concomitant character. Strictly, perhaps, an object of desire is describable in terms only of the character immediately relevant to the desire. The expression 'to desire what is X *qua* X' is perhaps redundant; and the expression 'to desire what is X *qua* Y' is perhaps self-contradictory. But those who think so must admit that such expressions are current among even careful speakers.

We all say we desire objects other than pleasure. We all say the objects of desire are various. But, if all objects of desire, however various, agree in being pleasant, if, in other words, every object of desire would, if realized, please, then we may be *loosely* said to desire only what is pleasant. Moreover, once satisfied that all objects of desire agree in being pleasant, we can hardly fail to entertain the hypothesis that we may be *strictly* said to desire only what is pleasant. The hypothesis may be formulated, if redundantly yet unmistakably, by saying *we desire only what is pleasant only* qua *pleasant*. Between this formula and the formula *we desire only pleasure* I shall not distinguish. Assuming that both formulae symbolize the same thing, I think that psychological hedonism is a plausible position and is certainly not to be dismissed on the bare ground that we all say we desire objects other than pleasure.

Towards the refutation of psychological hedonism the first step should be the recognition that not only desire, but also pleasure, has an object.[2] This we could not fail to recognize but for the con-

[1] Read at a meeting of the St. Andrews University Philosophical Society on January 9th, 1941.

[2] Such psychical states as have objects are said by Professor G. F. Stout to be *subjective* and by Professor Broad to be *objective*, while such psychical states as Professor Stout believes sensations to be are said by Professor Stout to be *objective* and by Professor Broad to be *non-objective*. What Professor

fusion of *pleasing* with *causing pleasure*. If we fall into this widely prevalent confusion, we lose the *object* of pleasure in the *cause* of pleasure. Once we firmly grasp the fact that not only desire but also pleasure has an object, we recognize further that the apparent objects of pleasure are no less various than are the apparent objects of desire. Only because of this, indeed, is psychological hedonism plausible. But the fact presented with a bias by saying that all objects of desire agree in being pleasant may be presented without any bias by saying that the objects that agree in being desired also agree in being pleasant. The presumption that we desire only what is pleasant only *qua* pleasant is no stronger than the presump tion that we are pleased only by what is desired only *qua* desired.

If these various objects of both pleasure and desire are desired *qua* pleasant, *qua* what, the psychological hedonist may be invited to tell us, do they please? And, if he gives the very good answer that what is X pleases *qua* X and what is Y pleases *qua* Y, he may be invited to consider or to reconsider the possibility that what is X is desired *qua* X and what is Y is desired *qua* Y. He may be invited to tell us why an ultimate variety in genuine objects of desire is any less tolerable than an ultimate variety in genuine objects of pleasure.

One might, indeed, set about explaining away the appearance of variety in objects of pleasure without assailing the appearance of variety in objects of desire. One might then reach the position that objects please only *qua* satisfying desire. This position may be described as the error complementary to psychological hedonism. For two reasons it is less plausible than psychological hedonism: (1) The fact that desire has an object is less easily blinked than is the fact that pleasure has an object. Accordingly the illusion of unity is less easily sustained. (2) Beings capable of pleasure but incapable of desire are more easily conceived than are beings capable of desire but incapable of pleasure. For the capacity to desire depends, while the capacity to be pleased does not, on the capacity to entertain what is not present.

Does Butler in rejecting psychological hedonism, fall into this complementary error?[1] Or does he succeed in avoiding both?

Two connected admissions must, I think, be made. Butler's language is not careful. Butler is not keenly alive to the possibility

Stout means by 'subjective' is, I think, exactly what Professor Broad means by 'objective.' What Professor Stout means by 'objective' is, I think, what Professor Broad means by 'objectifiable.' See Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology*, 2nd ed., pp. 3–4; *Manual of Psychology*, 4th ed., pp. 8–9; Broad's *Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp. 306–7.

[1] As Sidgwick supposes. See *Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed., pp. 44–5.

of the error complementary to psychological hedonism. I also think that these admissions suffice. Butler does not fall into either error. Not being keenly alive, however, to the possibllity of the error complementary to psychological hedonism, Butler fails, in distinguishing his position from psychological hedonism, at the same time unmistakably to distinguish his position from the complementary error.

"That all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them, is manifested from hence, that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion, there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another."[1]

What is this argument? What is Butler's premiss and what is his conclusion? His conclusion is formulated thus: "all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them." His premiss is twice formulated. It is formulated thus: "there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion." It is again formulated thus: "there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another . . . if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another."

The words "appetite," "passion," "affection" Butler here, as habitually, treats as synonyms. We are at liberty, in reformulating his argument, to make any of these words do duty for all. For reasons which will presently appear I select "affection." The words "pleasure," "enjoyment," "delight" Butler also here treats as synonyms. I select "pleasure."

Butler's premiss may accordingly be reformulated: *Whatever pleases must be an object of affection.* His conclusion, however, presents formidable difficulties, and I must defer the performance of no less a part of my task than the interpretation of both the word "particular" and the word "external." Can I without interpreting these words make anything of Butler's conclusion? I suggest that, however these words be interpreted, Butler's conclusion, whatever else it may involve, involves at least this: *Something distinct from pleasure is an object of affection.* I propose tentatively to diagnose Butler's argument as if his conclusion involved no more.

According to this provisional hypothesis Butler adduces the premiss: *Whatever pleases must be an object of affection* in support of the conclusion: *Something distinct from pleasure is an object of*

[1] *Sermon XI.*

affection. The suppressed premiss: *Something distinct from pleasure pleases* is easily detected, and the argument is easily diagnosed as a second order enthymeme in *Darii.*

Not only is this a valid argument. The suppressed premiss could be fairly taken as ultimate and could even be fairly taken as read —could, in other words, be fairly suppressed. But how must we interpret the express premiss and the conclusion? How—for only this is difficult—must we interpret the word "affection"?

Not as a synonym of "pleasure." For this yields as express premiss: *Whatever pleases must please* and as conclusion: *Something distinct from pleasure pleases.* The express premiss is sheerly tautological. The conclusion is identical with the suppressed premiss and is something that nobody would question.

Not as a synonym of "desire." For this yields as express premiss: *Whatever pleases must be desired* and as conclusion: *Something distinct from pleasure is desired.* The conclusion looks promising. But what of the express premiss? Butler could not of course mean that whatever pleases must *while it pleases* be desired. But he might mean that whatever pleases must *before it pleases* be desired.[1] And he might be supposed by the expression "prior suitableness" to distinguish this meaning. Even so, his claim would be paradoxical. It is perhaps not too unplausible for selection as a thesis. We might be willing to hear arguments *for* it. It is certainly too unplausible for selection as an ultimate premiss. We are not willing to hear arguments *from* it.

If the word "affection" can be interpreted as the name of no kind of psychical *state,* can the word be interpreted as the name of some kind of psychical *disposition*?

Not as a synonym of "disposition to be pleased." For this yields as express premiss: *Whatever pleases must be capable of pleasing* and as conclusion: *Something distinct from pleasure is capable of pleasing.* This express premiss would not be sheerly tautological. But it would be trivial. And the conclusion, while not identical with the suppressed premiss, would be immediately inferable from it, and would be something that nobody would question.

As a synonym, then, of "disposition to desire"? This yields as express premiss: *Whatever pleases must be capable of being desired* and as conclusion: *Something distinct from pleasure is capable of being desired.* This conclusion does not significantly differ from the conclusion already pronounced promising. But this express premiss does significantly differ from that already pronounced too unplausible for selection as an ultimate premiss.

[1] This is what Sidgwick supposes Butler to mean. Sidgwick takes for granted that "affection" is a synonym of "desire." With *Methods of Ethics,* 7th ed., p. 44, compare *Outlines of the History of Ethics,* 5th ed., p. 192.

This argument, obtained by interpreting "affection" as a synonym of "disposition to desire," is not unworthy of Butler. And I think it is his argument. Yet I do not think that "affection" would be correctly interpreted as a synonym of "disposition to desire." It must be interpreted rather as a synonym of "disposition *both* (under *some* conditions) to be pleased *and* (under *other* conditions) to desire."

Before submitting evidence in support of this interpretation I shall try to show that it can be adopted without prejudice to the argument. Butler's argument could, if this interpretation is correct, be formulated: Whatever pleases must be both capable of pleasing and capable of being desired, therefore something distinct from pleasure is both capable of pleasing and capable of being desired. What should we say of the argument thus formulated? That the reference to a capacity of pleasing is an otiose element of both the express premiss and the conclusion, but that for the rest the argument is just what we want. But the presence of the otiose element would, if the argument were thus formulated, be undeniably disturbing. Can the presence of the same otiose element be any less disturbing, I may be asked, if, though not admitting that Butler's argument is *thus* formulated, I admit that his argument is *synonymously* formulated? Need we even at all concern ourselves with the way in which Butler's argument is formulated beyond ascertaining what the formula means?

My answer is that the mere presence of an otiose element should never be disturbing. We must always ask how the otiose element comes to be present. And this a consideration of the meaning of the formula may not suffice to discover. The presence of an otiose element is disturbing where the writer goes out of his way to secure its presence. The presence of the same otiose element is not disturbing where the writer only fails to go out of his way to secure its absence.

If we keep these points in view, we shall not be disturbed by the presence of the otiose element in Butler's formulation of his argument. We can interpret "affection" as a synonym of "disposition both to be pleased and to desire." It is still open to us to surmise that the word "affection" is chosen for the sake of part of its meaning and despite the irrelevance of the remainder of its meaning. Butler thinks that the dispositions in question are dispositions both to be pleased and to desire. That they are dispositions to desire is all that his argument requires him to symbolize. And Butler has not troubled to symbolize more. He has only not troubled not to symbolize more.

In thus interpreting "affection" I am not supposing Butler to use this word in any sense other than its ordinary sense. I am inter-

preting 'to be an object of affection' as a synonym of 'to be liked.' And an examination of the ordinary sense of the verb 'to like' may at this point be helpful.

Many verbs, whose fundamental function is the indication of the presence of a certain psychical *state*, have also the derivative function of indicating the presence of the correlative psychical *disposition*. Such are the verbs 'to desire' and 'to please.' Accordingly we can say 'A desires this' without claiming that A is now desiring this. Similarly we can say 'This pleases A' without claiming that this is now pleasing A. At the same time, we can properly ask 'Is A now desiring this?' and 'Is this now pleasing A?' But we cannot properly ask 'Is A now liking this?' At no moment in the period throughout which you like an object are you liking it. You are never occupied in liking. The verb 'to like' has not the function of indicating the presence of any psychical *state*. Its sole function is the indication of the presence of a certain psychical *disposition*. Instead of asking 'Is A now liking this?' we must ask 'Is A now manifesting a like for this?'

This exclusive appropriation to the indication of the presence of a certain psychical *disposition* is determined by the nature of the disposition the indication of whose presence is the function of the verb 'to like.' If you lack either the disposition to desire an object or the disposition to be pleased by that object, you cannot be truly said to like the object. This merely by virtue of the meaning of the verb 'to like.' On the other hand, if you possess either the disposition to desire an object or the disposition to be pleased by that object, you can be truly said to like the object. But this no longer merely by virtue of the meaning of the verb 'to like.' For suppose, of the two dispositions to desire a certain object and to be pleased by that object, you possess the one but lack the other. Could you under these conditions be truly said to like the object? How should we reply to this question? I think we should have to admit that under these conditions you could not be truly said to like the object. How, if so, can I claim that if you possess either disposition you can be truly said to like the object? Only by insisting that if you possess either you possess both.

It is on this conviction that the ordinary sense of the verb 'to like' depends. The disposition to desire an object and the disposition to be pleased by that object are viewed, because necessarily conjoined, as a single disposition, manifesting itself under *some* conditions as a state of desire and under *other* conditions as a state of pleasure. The *state* of desiring an object and the *state* of being pleased by that object, on the other hand, so far from being necessarily conjoined, are necessarily disjoined. You cannot at the same moment

be in both states.[1] For this reason there is no psychical state whose presence the verb 'to like' could usefully indicate.

Consider now the effect of enlisting this verb for the formulation of Butler's argument. The argument would be formulated: Whatever pleases must be liked, therefore something distinct from pleasure is liked. We should not, given this formula, have much difficulty either in detecting or in absorbing the otiose element. We should easily see that the argument could be *synonymously* formulated: Whatever pleases must be both capable of pleasing and capable of being desired, therefore something distinct from pleasure is both capable of pleasing and capable of being desired. We should also easily see that the argument could be *fairly* formulated: Whatever pleases must be not only (as of course it is) capable of pleasing but also capable of being desired, therefore something distinct from pleasure is not only (as of course it is) capable of pleasing but also capable of being desired.

Enlistment of the same verb would enable us to formulate more unmistakably than Butler does his definition of happiness.[2] "The very idea of interest or happiness," Butler says, "consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object." There is some danger of interpreting this formula as restricting happiness to the gratification of desire.[3] We avoid the danger if we say instead that happiness consists in *getting what you like*, which, *pace* the March Hare, is the same thing as *liking what you get*.[4]

As alternative designations for what he sometines calls "affections" Butler uses not only, as already remarked, "appetites" and "passions," but also "principles of action" (frequently abbreviated to "principles"), "instincts," "propensions," "inclinations." Whether and, if at all, how Butler expected his readers (or his congregation

[1] But suppose you are confident that the object of your affection will be realized. Does not your affection then manifest itself at once as a state of pleasure and as a state of desire? Only as a state of pleasure if you are fully confident. Fully confident that my friend will to-morrow be appointed, I no longer desire, but am only pleased by, the prospective appointment. But what if the object of the affection is a state of the owner of the affection? Suppose you are fully confident that you will within ten minutes be eating your breakfast. Does desire here make way for pleasure? A desire merely *to eat your breakfast* would. A desire *to eat your breakfast now* of course would not. Where you are less than fully confident that the object of your affection will be realized, I admit that your affection may manifest itself at once as a less intense pleasure than you would experience if more confident and as a less intense desire than you would experience if less confident.

[2] *Preface to Sermons.*

[3] It is immediately after thus interpreting this definition that Sidgwick protests: "Butler has certainly over-stated his case" (*Methods*, etc., p. 44).

[4] The March Hare's point is of course only that getting *whatever* you like in not the same thing as liking *whatever* you get.

in the Chapel of the Rolls Court) to discriminate in construing this luxuriance, I do not inquire. I think Butler habitually takes for granted that the disposition to desire an object and the disposition to be pleased by that object are necessarily conjoined and necessarily accompanied moreover by a tendency so to act as to realize that object. And I think that, just because Butler habitually takes these things for granted, he cares little in respect of which of a number of aspects what he views as a single disposition is indicated.

In interpreting the expression 'to be an object of affection' as a synonym of 'to be liked,' I have disclaimed the implication that Butler uses the word "affection" in any sense other than its ordinary sense. That the word 'love,' in its commonest application, is restricted to a disposition to desire rather than a disposition to be pleased is a suggestion that would be made only by a hardened misogynist. That the expression 'self-love,' in its ordinary sense, is restricted to a disposition to desire rather than a disposition to be pleased by our own happiness is a suggestion that would be made only by a confirmed pessimist. Yet, although Butler says "private happiness or good is all that self-love can *make us desire, or be concerned about,*" he also allows himself the use of the phrase "the cool principle of self-love, or general *desire* of our own happiness."[1] And his unconcern about verbal accuracy in this matter is virtually acknowledged by his remark, concerning what he has just called "a general desire of his own happiness," that it "proceeds from, or is self-love."[2] That "benevolence, or the love of another" may be manifested as pleasure no less than as desire, Butler unmistakably implies. He implies this by asking, in the course of his refutation of the identification of benevolence with love of power, "Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; and *rejoicing in it,* though bestowed by a third person?"[3] He implies it again by asking, in the course of his defence of the thesis that there is no "peculiar inconsistence and contrariety" between self-love and benevolence, "Is desire of and delight in the happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love than desire of and delight in the esteem of another?"[4]

So much for the interpretation of the word "affection" and thereby of the conclusion: *Something distinct from pleasure is an object of affection.* But this conclusion is not Butler's conclusion. Butler's conclusion is "that all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them." I have suggested that, however the words "particular" and "external" be interpreted, Butler's conclusion, whatever else it may

[1] *Sermon XI.* Italics mine.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Sermon I,* footnote. Italics mine.
[4] *Sermon XI.*

involve, involves at least that the objects of some affections are distinct from pleasure. Even if this suggestion is sound, my diagnosis of Butler's argument as if his conclusion involved no more can only be tentative. What else, then, does Butler's conclusion involve? Butler concludes not merely that the objects of *some*, but that the objects of *"all particular,"* affections are distinct from pleasure; and he concludes not merely that these objects are *distinct from pleasure*, but that they are *"external things themselves."* Interpretation of the words "particular" and "external" can be no longer deferred.

In answer to the question "how Butler supposes human nature to be constituted," Professor Broad says[1] that "in all men" Butler "distinguishes four kinds of propensities or springs of action" and that these four kinds are: (1) what Butler "calls 'particular passions or affections,' " (2) "the general principle of cool self-love," (3) "the general principle of benevolence," (4) "the principle of Conscience." Of (2) Professor Broad says: "By this Butler means the tendency to seek the maximum happiness for ourselves over the whole course of our lives. It is essentially a rational calculating principle which leads us to check particular impulses and to co-ordinate them with each other in such a way as to maximise our total happiness in the long run." Of (3) Professor Broad says: "This, again, is a rational calculating principle, which must be sharply distinguished from a mere impulsive sympathy with people whom we see in distress. It is the principle which makes us try to maximise the general happiness according to a rational scheme and without regard to persons. I think it would be fair to say that the ideal of the Charity Organisation Society is benevolence in Butler's sense."

Later, however, when Professor Broad comes to "deal in detail with the two general principles of self-love and benevolence," he finds Butler "clearer about the former than about the latter." Butler, Professor Broad complains, "sometimes tends to drop benevolence, as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love, rather out of sight, and to talk of it as if it were just one of the particular impulses."[2]

Reading Butler with this complaint in mind, we may try to explain away the alleged occasional conflicting tendency. We shall try in vain. And we shall remain at a loss until we discover that what Professor Broad views as an occasional conflicting tendency is more than occasional and more than a tendency. What Professor

[1] *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, pp. 60–1. Professor Broad's chapter on Butler was first published in the *Hibbert Journal*. Only after prolonged study have I become convinced that much of what Professor Broad so lucidly says requires to be unsaid. But I have at the same time become convinced of the importance of unsaying it.

[2] P. 71.

Broad complains that Butler *sometimes tends to do* is what Butler *always does*. Benevolence "as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love" is never *in* sight. Butler *always* talks of benevolence "as if it were just one of the particular"—I will not say "impulses" but, to use one of Professor Broad's words, "propensities," or, to use one of Butler's words, "affections." To say that it is "just one of the particular" affections is, I take it, to say just that it is one of the particular affections. No doubt it is one in which Butler is especially interested. And probably it resembles self-love in important respects in which other particular affections do not.

Professor Broad says: "I have assumed throughout that he regards benevolence as a general principle which impels us to maximise the happiness of humanity without regard to persons, just as he certainly regards self-love as a general principle leading us to maximise our own total happiness."[1] Why has Professor Broad assumed this? It is an assumption in support of which he offers no evidence. He does offer evidence of the alleged occasional conflicting tendency. And it is significant that he selects this evidence from *Sermon I*—the one[2] place where benevolence "as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love" can seem to be in sight.

For the thesis of *Sermon I* is "that there are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good." And, in supporting this thesis, Butler certainly treats benevolence as being the same kind of indication "that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures" as self-love is "that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good."

Here, accordingly, we must expect to find benevolence treated as being in at least some respects to society what self-love is to the individual. But, if, as Professor Broad says he has "assumed throughout," Butler "regards benevolence as a general principle which impels us to maximise the happiness of humanity without regard

[1] P. 71.

[2] With the possible exception of *Sermon V*, where, however, what Butler calls "a public spirit, i.e. a settled reasonable principle of benevolence to mankind" is hardly distinguished from "reason and duty." Cf. Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, p. 195; A. E. Taylor, *Mind*, 1930, p. 342. But I do not deny that what Professor Broad calls "the happiness of humanity without regard to persons" is, according to Butler, the object of *some* benevolence. I deny that such benevolence is, according to Butler, the whole of benevolence; and I deny that either such or any other benevolence is ever viewed by Butler as co-ordinate with self-love in *generality*. Mr. J. M. Brown, of the University of St. Andrews, has been kind enough to send me some discerning comments on the interpretation of *Sermon V*.

to persons, just as he certainly regards self-love as a general principle leading us to maximise our own total happiness," we must expect to find more. What do we find? In the very process of urging that benevolence is the same kind of indication "that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures" as self-love is "that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private good," Butler says: "There is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is *in some degree*[1] to society what self-love is to the individual." It is thus that Butler introduces benevolence. He proceeds "And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion, for compassion is momentary love; if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another; this is itself benevolence, or the love of another." In here adducing paternal and filial affection as examples of benevolence Professor Broad finds Butler inconsistent on the ground that these "aim at the benefit of some particular person."[2] But Butler's illustrations are clearly the product of no mere momentary oversight. For he proceeds: "Be it ever so short, be it ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive." And, in a footnote defending the claim that there is such a thing as "benevolence or good will in men towards each other," Butler remarks that "the question is not concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning the affection itself." Pretty certainly it is because he thinks that what Professor Broad calls "the happiness of humanity without regard to persons" is not the object of all, even if it is the object of some, benevolence that Butler is careful to claim only that benevolence "is *in some degree* to society what self-love is to the individual."

I say even *if* of some. For in *Sermon XII* Butler asserts that "as man is so much limited in his capacity, as so small a part of the creation comes under his notice and influence, and as we are not used to consider things in so general[3] a way; it is not to be thought of, that the universe should be the object of benevolence to such creatures as we are." And, while "for this reason moral writers also have substituted a less general[3] object for our benevolence, mankind," Butler asserts that "this likewise is an object too general,[3] and very much out of our view." He further insists: "There plainly is wanting a less general[3] and nearer object of benevolence for the

[1] My italics. [2] Pp. 71–2.

[3] Butler *does* here use "general" pretty much as in *Sermon I* he uses "extensive." It is not thus that he uses "general" when he distinguishes between general and particular affections.

bulk of men, than that of their country. Therefore the Scripture, not being a book of theory and speculation, but a plain rule of life for mankind, has with the utmost possible propriety put the principle of virtue upon the love of our neighbour; which is that part of the universe, that part of mankind, that part of our country, which comes under our immediate notice, acquaintance, and influence, and with which we have to do." Now "the love of our neighbour is the same with charity, benevolence, or goodwill: it is an affection to the good and happiness of our fellow-creatures."

Is it not plain, moreover, that Professor Broad's interpretation would wreck the argument of *Sermon I*? For here "the nature of man is . . . to be judged of . . . by what appears in the common world, in the bulk of mankind." Charity Organisation Society indeed!

Perhaps Professor Broad, in misrepresenting, is flattering, Butler. Though Butler *does not* view benevolence "as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love," perhaps Butler *ought* so to view benevolence. What is the doctrine with which Professor Broad thus presents him? It recognizes, as Professor Broad thinks Butler sometimes fails to recognize, "the intrinsic difference between benevolence, which is a general principle, and the particular impulses which aim at producing happiness in certain particular men or classses of men, *e.g.* patriotism or paternal affection."[1] It has to reject patriotism and paternal affection as illustrations of benevolence, Professor Broad thinks, in order to view benevolence "as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love."

Yet I hope to show that only by *accepting* paternal affection as an illustration of benevolence could we view benevolence "as a general principle co-ordinate with self-love." The object of paternal affection, let us grant, is the happiness of a particular man, and the object of patriotism that of a particular class of men. The object of Professor Broad's "general principle of benevolence," being "the happiness of humanity without regard to persons," could be defensibly contrasted as general with the object of paternal affection, and as at least more general with the object of patriotism. But the object of self-love, being the happiness of a particular man, would have to be rated as no more general than the object of paternal affection and as less general than the object of patriotism. There is indeed an irrelevant sense in which sons might be held more particular than their fathers. I am not aware of even an irrelevant sense in which fathers might be held less general than their sons. In any case, sons, no less than fathers, may be objects of self-love. And Professor Broad says of both paternal and filial affection that they "aim at the benefit of some particular person." Very well. Let A be the father of B. Then the object of A's self-love is the object of B's

[1] P. 72.

filial affection, and the object of B's self-love is the object of A's paternal affection.

Is Professor Broad then mistaken in viewing *self-love* as a general principle? As his "general principle of benevolence" is general because without regard to persons, so his "general principle of self-love" is general because without regard to times. But, just as much as self-love, paternal affection, though not general respecting persons, may be general respecting times. Professor Broad has no justification for saying: "Really paternal affection is just as much a particular impulse as hunger, and it can no more be identified with benevolence than hunger can be identified with self-love."[1]

Thus so far from forbidding, Professor Broad's distinction between general and particular would demand, the co-ordination of paternal affection with self-love. And, for this very reason, Professor Broad's distinction between general and particular cannot be Butler's. For Butler, undertaking "to consider the nature, the object and end of that self-love, as distinguished from other principles or affections in the mind, and their respective objects,"[2] proceeds: "Every man hath a general desire of his own happiness; and likewise a variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to particular external objects. The former proceeds from, or is self-love, and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness, so as to have that interest an object to their minds; what is to be said of the latter is, that they proceed from, or together make up that particular nature, according to which man is made. The object the former pursues is somewhat internal, our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction, whether we have, or have not a distinct particular perception what it is, or wherein it consists; the objects of the latter are this or that particular external thing which the affections tend towards and of which it hath always a particular idea or perception."

Butler seems here to contrast self-love as general with *all* other affections as particular.[3] He seems moreover to view his distinction between general and particular as coincident with his distinction between internal and external. With the having a particular external object he contrasts the having a general internal object. Both distinctions present difficulty.

[1] P. 72. [2] *Sermon XI.*

[3] That *benevolence* is among the particular affections Butler unmistakably implies by comparing benevolence with "any other particular affection whatever" (*Preface to Sermons*). Moreover he explicitly identifies "the love of our neighbour" with benevolence (*Sermons XI, XII*). And that *this* is among the particular affections Butler not only by the expression "every particular affection, even the love of our neighbour" unmistakably implies but also by the expression "the one particular affection to the good of our neighbour" explicitly claims (*Sermon XI*).

Can the distinction between general and particular be so interpreted as to make defensible, or at least plausible, the contrasting of the object of self-love as general with the object of benevolence as particular? Can such interpretation be achieved consistently with the admission that what is the object of the self-love of one may also be an object of the benevolence of another? A's happiness is at once object of A's self-love and object of B's benevolence. Considered as object of A's self-love A's happiness must be general. Considered as object of B's benevolence this same thing, A's happiness, must be particular. Is this possible?

The corresponding problem concerning the distinction between internal and external is easily solved. There is no difficulty in seeing how A's happiness can be held at once internal object of A's self-love and external object of B's benevolence. Whether the object of an affection is internal or external depends only partly on the location of the object and depends further on the location of the affection. The object is internal or external according as the object and the affection are identically or differently located.

Can this help us towards the desired interpretation of the distinction between general and particular?

Admitting that affections differ in kind only so far as their objects differ in kind, we can yet contrast affection in general, *affection without regard to the object of affection*, with particular affections. We must beware, indeed, of taking affection in general for anything more than an abstraction. For failure to regard an object of affection involves failure to regard an affection. And there is no affection whose object is merely objects in general. But it might be suggested that there is an affection whose object is merely *objects of affection in general*. And the object of such an affection might well be contrasted as general with the object of every other affection as particular. Butler, however, perhaps thinks that there is no such affection and that the affection whose object might be mistaken for *objects of affection in general* is an affection whose object is really *the enjoyment of their objects by affections in general*. Butler perhaps thinks, in other words, that the object of this affection is really happiness in general, happiness without regard to the objects of happiness. Now, if we thus identify happiness in general, not with happiness without regard to *persons*, but with happiness without regard to *the objects of happiness*, we are at liberty to distinguish A's happiness in general from B's happiness in general. A's happiness in general will be A's happiness without regard to the objects of A's happiness, in other words, the enjoyment of their objects by A's affections in general. A's happiness in general can accordingly be contrasted as general with every other object of A's affections as particular. Plainly it cannot be contrasted as general with every other object of B's

affections as particular. At the same time, among the other objects of A's affections, with which as particular A's happiness in general can be contrasted as general, is B's happiness in general. From the standpoint of A, A's happiness in general is a general object, B's happiness in general is a particular object. Now it is from the standpoint of A that A's happiness in general is an object of self-love, while B's happiness in general is an object of A's benevolence.

With some difficulty, then, we have so interpreted the distinction between general and particular as to require, consistently with the admission that what is the object of the self-love of one may be also an object of the benevolence of another, the classification. both of the object of self-love as general and of the object of benevolence as particular. The corresponding problem concerning the distinction between internal and external, I have said, is easily solved. There is no difficulty in so interpreting the distinction between internal and external as to require A's happiness to be at once internal object of A's self-love and external object of B's benevolence. The distinction is so interpreted if the object of an affection is taken to be internal where it is, external where it is not, a state of the owner of the affection. Butler, however, appears to hold that no affection except self-love has an internal object. He certainly holds that what he calls "the appetites of sense" have external objects. Yet it is obvious that the objects of many affections besides self-love, including many "appetites of sense," are states of the owners of the affections. This interpretation of the distinction between internal and external costs the admission that Butler is guilty of a bad blunder.

There is therefore a good reason for seeking an alternative interpretation. And an alternative interpretation easily suggests itself. That to which an external object of affection is external is, perhaps, not the owner of the affection but simply the affection itself. To be external is, perhaps, no more than to be distinct from every manifestation of the affection and especially from what Butler calls "the pleasure arising from its gratification."

In support of this interpretation one might urge that it would justify Butler in holding that the object of *every* affection other than self-love is an external object. And an even more impressive defence of this interpretation is available. One might urge that Butler explicitly sanctions it. For consider the expression "external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them." Here the phrase "distinct from the pleasure arising from them" is most easily construed as explanatory of the adjective "external." And what Butler here calls "the pleasure arising from them" can hardly be anything other than what he would more carefully identify as

the pleasure arising from the gratification of the affections of which they are the objects.

This is profoundly disturbing. I have proceeded on the assumption that Butler's conclusion involves at least that something distinct from pleasure is an object of affection. And, having tentatively diagnosed Butler's argument as if his conclusion involved no more, I have since been trying to interpret the words "particular" and "external" in order to ascertain what *else* Butler's conclusion involves. But, if Butler's conclusion is only that the objects of particular affections are distinct from the pleasure arising from the gratification of those affections, even my assumption concerning what Butler's conclusion *at least* involves is in danger.

I grant that Butler explicitly sanctions this interpretation. I take the desperate course of denying that Butler means what he says. If he does, he is wrong and very obviously wrong in holding that the object of self-love is internal.[1] Obviously, on this interpretation of the distinction between internal and external, the object of *every* affection is external.

So far, then, in choosing between alternative interpretations of the distinction between internal and external, we have to choose only between finding Butler guilty of one bad blunder and finding him guilty of another. I cannot yet rest my case. What I must try next to show is that there is abundant evidence of Butler's failure, however surprising, to recognize that self-love is not the only affection whose object is a state of the owner of the affection.

Butler is content to identify the object of hunger as "merely food." On this Professor Broad comments: "the word 'hunger' is ambiguous. It may mean certain organic sensations which are generally caused by lack of food. Or it may mean an impulse to eat which generally accompanies these. Butler evidently uses the word in the latter sense. But, even in this sense, it seems to me inaccurate to say that the object of hunger is food. It would be equally true to say that the object of a butcher going to market is food; but he may not be hungry. The object or aim of hunger is *to eat food*. The object of the butcher is to buy it as cheaply and sell it as dearly as

[1] The object of self-love must be distinguished from what Butler calls "the pleasure self-love would have, from knowing I myself should be happy some time hence" (*Sermon XI*). Equally the object of self-love must be distinguished from the pleasure (if indeed such pleasure is possible) self-love would have from knowing I myself am happy now. These, being pleasures arising from the gratification of self-love, would be *particular* pleasures. There might be some excuse for saying, though I cannot imagine Butler saying it, that a particular pleasure of mine is internal to my pleasure in general. There could be no excuse for saying that my pleasure in general is internal to a particular pleasure of mine. The object of self-love, then, must be external to the pleasure arising from the gratification of self-love.

possible. In fact the object of an impulse is never, strictly speaking, a thing or person; it is always to change or to preserve some state of a thing or person."[1] But the object of hunger is not adequately identified even as "to eat food" or "the eating of food."[2] And Professor Broad goes on to identify the object of hunger more adequately as "one's own eating." He accordingly classifies hunger among "those particular impulses which aim at producing or maintaining states of the agent himself."[3]

Professor Broad thus adequately corrects Butler.[4] The only fault I find with Professor Broad's account is the amiable fault of hushing up Butler's fault: "It sounds to us odd when Butler says that ambition and hunger are just as disinterested as pity and malice. He is perfectly right, in his own sense of 'disinterested,' and it is a very important sense. It is true that neither ambition nor hunger aims at one's happiness. . . . If by 'disinterested' you mean 'not done with the motive of maximizing one's own happiness on the whole,' it is quite clear that hunger and ambition can lead only to disinterested actions. The appearance of paradox in Butler's statements is explained by the distinctions we have drawn."[5] I protest that by 'disinterested' we do not mean "not done with the motive of maximizing one's own happiness on the whole." Nor does Butler; and, in thus presenting Butler with "his own sense of 'disinterested,' " Professor Broad is convicting Butler of an offence of which Butler is innocent in an attempt to avoid convicting Butler of an offence of which Butler is guilty. The offence, moreover, of perverting a word to a peculiar sense and thereby achieving an "appearance of paradox" is not in Butler's character. Butler raises the question of the meaning of this word: "But the most natural way of speaking plainly is, to call the first only, self-love, and the actions proceeding from it, interested: and to say of the latter, that they are not love to ourselves, but movements towards somewhat external: honour, power, the harm or good of another: and that the pursuit of these external objects, so far as it proceeds from these movements (for it may proceed from self-love) is no otherwise interested, than as every action of every creature must, from the nature of the thing, be; for no one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own."[6] "The most intelligible way of speaking of it seems to be this: that self-love and the actions done in consequence of it (for these will presently appear to be the same as to this question) are interested; that particular affections towards external objects, and

[1] P. 67. [2] P. 68. [3] P. 69.

[4] Hunger, however, when distinguished from the organic sensations, is not accurately identified with an *impulse*. And the *object* of hunger is not accurately identified with an *aim*. Hunger is a *state of desire*.

[5] Pp. 70–1. [6] *Preface to Sermons*.

the actions done in consequence of those affections, are not so. But every one is at liberty to use words as he pleases. All that is here insisted upon is, that ambition, revenge, benevolence, all particular passions whatever, and all the actions they produce, are equally interested or disinterested."[1] In these passages Butler grudgingly concedes a sense of 'interested' in which action is as such 'interested,' but insists on a sense of 'interested' in which, while self-love is interested, affections whose objects are external are disinterested. And Butler plainly supposes this to be the established sense. Finally, Butler says: "The object of self-love is expressed in the term, self: and every appetite of sense, and every particular affection of the heart, are equally interested or disinterested, because the objects of them all are equally self or somewhat else."[2] Could Butler say this if he recognized that, while the objects of some of these affections are not, the objects of others of these affections are, states of the owner?

Butler's failure to recognize that self-love is not the only affection whose object is a state of the owner appears further in his defence of the thesis that there is no "peculiar inconsistence and contrariety" between self-love and benevolence, though I think that recognition of what Butler fails to recognize requires less radical revision of the thesis defended than of the mode of defending it.

By claiming "that benevolence is not more unfriendly to self-love, than any other particular affection whatever," "that benevolence is not in any respect more at variance with self-love, than any other particular affection whatever, but that it is in every respect, at least, as friendly to it,"[3] Butler does not undertake to show either that benevolence is not unfriendly, or that benevolence is friendly, to self-love. "The comparison is not between self-love and the love of our neighbour; between pursuit of our own interest, and the interest of others: but between the several particular affections in human nature towards external objects, as one part of the comparison; and the one particular affection to the good of our neighbour, as the other part of it: and it has been shown, that all these have the same respect to self-love and private interest."[4] All particular affections, that is, have the same respect to self-love whatever that respect may be. Yet Butler's occasional substitution for "not more unfriendly" of "as friendly" is probably significant. For Butler holds that the object of self-love, namely happiness, "consists in the gratification of particular passions, which supposes the having of them."[5] "Take away these affections, and you leave self-love absolutely nothing at all to employ itself about; no end or object for it to pursue, excepting only that of avoiding pain."[6]

[1] *Sermon XI.* [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Preface to Sermons.*
[4] *Sermon XI.* [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Preface to Sermons.*

This is obviously true if we interpret "affection" as a synonym of 'disposition to be pleased.' It is also true if we interpret "affection" as a synonym of 'disposition to desire'; but it is then true only because the two dispositions are necessarily conjoined. We may indeed go even further than Butler here does: "Besides, the very idea of an interested pursuit, necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object. It is not because we love ourselves that we find delight in such and such objects, but because we have particular affections towards them. Take away these affections, and you leave self-love absolutely nothing at all to employ itself about; no end or object for it to pursue, excepting only that of avoiding pain. Indeed the Epicureans, who maintained that absence of pain was the highest happiness, might, consistently with themselves, deny all affection, and, if they had so pleased, every sensual appetite too; but the very idea of interest or happiness other than absence of pain implies particular appetites or passions; these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness." But the reservation made by the expression "other than absence of pain" may be cancelled. Pain without dispositions to be pained by something other than pain is as impossible as pleasure without dispositions to be pleased by something other than pleasure.

Granted, however, that all affections for particular objects minister in some degree to self-love and granted that among affections for particular objects are affections for external objects, I question whether affections for particular external objects minister to self-love in the same degree as do affections for particular internal objects. Butler himself distinguishes in *Sermon I* "the several passions or appetites distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention is the security and good of society; and the passions distinct from self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and good of the individual." And he illustrates the distinction: "Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite; because the end for which it was given us is the preservation of the individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion; because the end for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards society. The respect which this has to private good is as remote as the respect which that has to public good: and the appetite is no more self-love, than the passion is benevolence. The object and end of the former is merely food; the object and end of the latter is merely esteem: but the latter can no more be gratified, without contributing to the good of society, than the former can be gratified without contributing to the preservation of the individual." Now, granted that the respect which benevolence has to private good is no more remote

than the respect which love of esteem has to private good, is the respect which benevolence has to private good any less remote than the respect which love of esteem has to private good, and is not the respect which both these affections have to private good more remote than the respect which hunger has to private good? *Sermon XI* is strangely oblivious of the distinction drawn in *Sermon I*.

"Happiness consists in the gratification of certain affections, appetites, passions, with objects which are by Nature adapted to them. Self-love may indeed set us on work to gratify these: but happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection with self-love but arises from such gratification alone. Love of our neighbour is one of those affections."[1] I grant that love of our neighbour is among the affections in whose gratification happiness consists. In what, I ask, does the gratification of love of our neighbour consist? Butler's answer is as follows: "This, considered as a virtuous principle, is gratified by a consciousness of endeavouring to promote the good of others; but considered as a natural affection, its gratification consists in the actual accomplishment of this endeavour."

This answer ignores the fact that the object of the affection is not a state of the owner of the affection. It will not do to suppose that Butler either writes "gratification" in mistake for 'fulfilment' or uses "gratification" in his own sense. For he has just claimed that "happiness consists in the gratification of certain affections," and he proceeds: "Now indulgence or gratification of this affection, whether in that consciousness or this accomplishment, has the same respect to interest, as indulgence of any other affection; they equally proceed from or do not proceed from self-love, they equally include or equally exclude this principle." But, while *gratification* of love of our neighbour may, just as much as gratification of hunger, promote our own happiness, mere *fulfilment* of its object, mere coming to be of the good of others, cannot at all promote our own happiness. Our own happiness depends, so far as love of our neighbour is concerned, not on the good of others but on our beliefs about the good of others. However others may prosper, our benevolence is not gratified unless we hear of their prosperity. At the same time, our benevolence *is* gratified when we *believe*, whether truly or falsely, that others prosper. Now, even if we concede, as I should not, that gratification of my hunger depends not on my eating but on my belief that I am eating, we must insist that gratification without fulfilment and fulfilment without gratification are here less easy.

I say only that Butler fails to consider and ought to consider this difference between internal and external objects. That consideration of this difference would show benevolence to be any less friendly

[1] *Sermon XI*.

than is hunger to self-love, I do not claim. Perhaps the disadvantage that fulfilment is possible without gratification is sufficiently compensated by the advantage that gratification is possible without fulfilment.[1]

So much for the relevance of the fact that the object of benevolence is not a state of the owner of the affection to the question whether benevolence is "as friendly" as "any other particular affection whatever" to self-love. What of the relevance of the same fact to the question whether benevolence is "not more unfriendly"?

This question is more elaborately formulated as the question: "what respect benevolence hath to self-love, and the pursuit of private interest to the pursuit of public, or whether there be anything of that peculiar inconsistence and contrariety between them, over and above what there is between self-love and other passions and particular affections, and their respective pursuits."[2] And, having answered part of this question, Butler says: "Thus it appears that there is no peculiar contrariety between self-love and benevolence; no greater competition between these, than between any other particular affections and self-love. This relates to the affections themselves. Let us now see whether there be any peculiar contrariety between the respective courses of life which these affections lead to; whether there be any greater competition between the pursuit of private and of public good, than between any other particular pursuits and that of private good." Butler's thesis is then twofold. He contends (1) that there is no greater competition between benevolence and self-love than between any other particular affection and self-love, (2) that there is no greater competition between the pursuit of the object of benevolence and the pursuit of the object of self-love than between the pursuit of the object of any other particular affection and the pursuit of the object of self-love.

I find some difficulty in interpreting (1). Whatever Plato may say in the Fourth Book of the *Republic*, it seems clear that no two affections, as distinguished from the pursuits of their objects, can be contrary. It seems clear that nothing, except preoccupation, could prevent the most intense self-love from accompanying the most intense love of our neighbour. But perhaps we owe it to Butler that such things seem clear. Certainly Butler finds it necessary

[1] An eminent Harley Street specialist once told me that he had advised a patient, whose record was one of uniform deterioration in response to varied treatment, to eat an orange every morning. I shall always remember the words in which the specialist summed up the effect of this advice: "Went away. Neither saw nor heard of him from that day to this. Completely cured."

[2] *Sermon XI.*

expressly to insist that mere distinctness is not contrariety: "But that benevolence is distinct from, that is, not the same with self-love, is no reason for its being looked upon with any peculiar suspicion; because every principle whatever, by means of which self-love is gratified, is distinct from it, and all things which are distinct from each other, are equally so. . . . We use the word property so as to exclude any other persons having an interest in that of which we say a particular man has the property. And we often use the word selfish so as to exclude in the same manner all regards to the good of others. But the cases are not parallel: for though that exclusion is really part of the idea of property, yet such positive exclusion, or bringing this peculiar disregard to the good of others into the idea of self-love, is in reality adding to the idea or changing it from what it was before stated to consist in, namely, in an affection to ourselves."[1] That benevolence is not lack of self-love and that self-love is not lack of benevolence could only through confusion be questioned.

But is this the whole of (1)? "Is desire of and delight in the happiness of another any more a diminution of self-love, than desire of and delight in the esteem of another? They are both equally desire of and delight in somewhat external to ourselves: either both or neither are so." I think Butler is here contending that there is no peculiar competition between manifestations, whether as desire or as pleasure, of benevolence and manifestations of self-love. If so, I think Butler once more misses the relevance of the externality of the object of benevolence. Let us vary his illustration: (*a*) Instead of comparing the competition of self-love and benevolence with the competition of self-love and love of esteem (an object, as Butler says, equally "external to ourselves"), compare the competition of self-love and benevolence with the competition of self-love and hunger. (*b*) Instead of manifestations of the competing affections in delight, consider manifestations in pain.

Delight in the happiness of another is not a diminution of our own happiness. Pain at the unhappiness of another plainly is a diminution of our own happiness. But is it any more a diminution of our own happiness than is the pain of starvation? Perhaps not. Certainly the externality of the object of benevolence does not show this. But the externality of the object of benevolence might be forcefully urged in support of something equally relevant. It might be forcefully urged that external objects are less than internal objects under the control of the agent. In particular, I can be more confident of my ability to avoid starvation and even to keep my table plentifully supplied and my appetite healthy than of my ability to avert the misery of my neighbour. Accordingly my benevo-

[1] *Sermon XI.*

lence exposes me to disappointment more than does my affection for eating.[1]

But Butler's most paradoxical contention is that there is no greater competition between the *pursuit* of the object of benevolence, than between the *pursuit* of the object of any other particular affection, and the *pursuit* of the object of self-love. And it is here that I think that Butler's neglect of the externality of the object of benevolence is responsible for his most serious omission.

Just because the object of benevolence is not a state of the owner of the affection, it is possible for a man to sacrifice his own happiness, even to sacrifice his life, for the sake of the object of his benevolence. It is also possible for a man to lose his life in an attempt to appease his hunger. He may lose his life in an attempt to obtain food. He may lose his life as a result of injudicious eating. And, if anyone were to urge that the prudent man would never satisfy or seek to satisfy his hunger at the cost of either his life or his happiness, Butler might reply that the contrariety or unfriendliness between hunger and self-love remains whether hunger prevails over self-love or self-love prevails over hunger. But perhaps hunger can prevail over self-love only where self-love is not fully aroused. It is hard to see how a man could deliberately choose to eat rather than to live. We do think it possible, on the other hand, for a man, fully recognizing the alternatives, to choose his own death or misery accompanied by the life or happiness of another rather than his own life or happiness accompanied by the death or misery of another. Just because the object of benevolence is a worthy competitor, benevolence can, while hunger cannot, overcome self-love in fair fight. Now Butler might be consistent in claiming that benevolence is not on this account "more unfriendly" to self-love. To be a more powerful enemy is perhaps not the same thing as to be more of an enemy. But Butler's claim that there is "no greater competition" is surely in need of qualification.

While I think Butler fails to recognize that self-love is not the only affection whose object is a *state* of the owner of the affection, I also think this failure is incidental to Butler's insistence that self-love is the only affection whose object is the *pleasure* of the owner of the affection. It is not unlikely indeed that distinctness from the *pleasure* of the owner of the affection is all that Butler, in using the expression "external object," commonly has in view. It is possible even that Butler, had his attention been called to the point, would, retaining this expression, have defined "external" as synonymous, not with 'distinct from every state of the owner of the affection,' but with 'distinct from the pleasure of the owner

[1] Bacon might have urged this in support of his claim "He that hath wife and children, hath given hostages to fortune."

of the affection.' But I think this would be a monstrously arbitrary definition. I have indeed conceded that, in the expression "external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them," the phrase "distinct from the pleasure arising from them" is explanatory of the adjective "external." But *this* definition would not be arbitrary. Against this definition I bring no objection. In denying that Butler can mean what he says, my point is only that Butler cannot mean that self-love has an internal object if "external" is thus defined.

If Butler is to succeed in doing what he plainly intends to do, namely to contrast with self-love affections "towards external things themselves," he must not represent the objects of these affections as distinct merely from *the pleasure arising from the gratification of these affections*. At the same time he of course must not, since he puts benevolence among these affections, represent the objects of all these affections as distinct from *pleasure*. What he ought to do is rather to represent the objects of these affections as distinct from *the pleasure of the owner of these affections*. For this purpose the adjective "external" is not suitable. And Butler would, I think, have done better if, dropping this word, he had said simply that all particular affections are towards objects distinct from the pleasure of the owner of the affections.

I began by suggesting that, however the words "particular" and "external" be interpreted, Butler's claim "that all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them," whatever else it may involve, involves at least the claim that something distinct from pleasure is an object of affection. Now that I have at last considered the interpretation of both these words, I must at last say what else I take Butler's claim to involve.

I have said that Butler seems to contrast self-love as general with all other affections as particular. I think Butler really does this and that his claim "that all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them" is a claim about all affections other than self-love. The object of any man's self-love is that man's happiness in general, the enjoyment of their objects by that man's affections in general. It might be supposed, however, that among a man's affections are affections the object of any one of which is the enjoyment, not indeed by *that* affection of *its* object, but by some *other* affection of *its* object—that, for example, besides the affection whose object is *his own eating*, a man has an affection whose object is *the enjoyment of his own eating by the former affection*. Such an affection might fairly compete for the title "self-love." Its object would be the happiness of the owner of the affection. But its object would be,

not his happiness in general, but this or that happiness in particular, consisting in the gratification of this or that affection in particular. Butler would not, I think, question the propriety of calling such an affection "self-love." But he would, I think, deny that there are such affections. And his claim "that all particular appetites and passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them" is, I think, just this denial.

Butler's position is this: Among the affections of every man is an affection whose object is his own pleasure; but the only affection whose object is his own pleasure is one whose object is his own pleasure in general, without regard to the objects of his pleasure. Butler does not, so far as I know, anywhere succeed in establishing this claim. Certainly the argument which he at once offers does not succeed in establishing it. We must concede his premiss about the indispensability of "prior suitableness." A man cannot enjoy his own eating unless he has an affection whose object is his own eating. His disposition to be pleased by his own eating involves a disposition to desire his own eating. It does not follow that a man cannot have, besides this affection whose object is his own eating, another affection whose object is the enjoyment of his own eating by the former affection. All that Butler's argument establishes is that any affection of mine whose object is my pleasure presupposes an affection of mine whose object is distinct from my pleasure.

Butler's claim may nevertheless be true. And his argument at least removes the most obvious impediment to the admission of the claim. Once we have grasped the fact that a man's disposition to be pleased by his own eating involves a disposition to desire his own eating, do we still care to press the demand for the recognition of a disposition either to desire or to be pleased by *being pleased by his own eating*? Where you are really bent on pleasure and not on anything distinct from pleasure, can you really care whether the pleasure you get is pleasure from one thing rather than from another?

We may indeed go even further than Butler does. Butler drives the psychological hedonist from every position but one. He leaves the psychological hedonist in undisputed possession of the stronghold of self-love. Even this concession is disputable. We may reject the alleged disposition to desire and to be pleased by even one's own happiness in general. What, if we reject this disposition, shall we say of "cool self-love"? That it is a disposition rather to *choose* than to *desire* and rather to *welcome* than to *be pleased by*. And this is perhaps what Butler himself thinks when he uses the expression "reasonable self-love" and when he claims: "It is manifest that self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion."[1] But Butler never sufficiently distinguishes choice from desire.

[1] *Sermon II.*

Psychological hedonism, however, is the doctrine that pleasure is the object of *every* desire. Whether pleasure is the object of no desire or of only one desire or of a number of desires, Butler's refutation of psychological hedonism stands.

And what a notable contribution to psychology it is! Butler does not, in rejecting psychological hedonism, fall into the complementary error. What he does is something far more original. He grasps the important element of truth common to both errors. There is a necessary connexion between desire and pleasure. But the connexion is not between states but between dispositions. Pleasure is not the sole object of desire. Satisfaction of desire is not the sole object of pleasure. The objects of desire and the objects of pleasure are various. But the disposition to desire and the disposition to be pleased by the same object are necessarily connected.

SHAKESPEARE ON THE WARS OF ENGLAND

Professor JOHN LAIRD

In these grim and heavy years, despite all their inroads upon leisure, it seems likely that Shakespeare is read more widely and loved more deeply in this country than for many generations past, and since foreign communiqués as well as British ministers of the crown have been known to quote from him, it may be conjectured that the world as well as these islands is sensible of a part of the debt that humanity owes him. Be that as it may, there is perennial refreshment in the blended wit and wisdom and fancy of his immortal pages, and a timely privilege for his countrymen in the fact that his Histories dealt with anguished, bitter years. To be sure, we read him more for his timelessness than for his timeliness, and allow, with the speaker in *King John* that "He is but a bastard to the times, That doth not smack of observation." Such observation is just philosophy; but even philosophy reacts to the stimulus of its immediate environment.

Therefore, although I have to show some effrontery in attempting this essay, I have less occasion for apology than might appear on the surface. I admit that I know nothing of stagecraft and am not a great playgoer; that I have the sketchiest knowledge of British history and no knowledge at all of Shakespeare's sources: that my savour for literature, such as it is, is little more than a loutish affection for words. These are grave defects, but there is nothing very presumptuous in attempting to set down some of the crude impressions of a mere reader of Shakespeare who loves his author. There are many in like case, and it would be sad if they had all to be dumb. No doubt there is an inevitable and a painful chasm between the littleness of the commentator and the amplitude of the master. That, however, would apply to most commentators. For the rest of it, I should say that in things which have a universal appeal, a layman has a certain right to be vocal, although not as good a right as a specialist has.

So, rashly but humbly, I intend to proceed to my theme, but with one very significant restriction. In what is to follow I shall confine myself entirely to Shakespeare's histories of the kings of England, beginning with *King John* and ending with *Henry VIII*.[1] What I say may need correction from passages in the other plays

[1] I am not referring to the order in which the plays were written.

that I do not now recall. That is another defect. Still, this restricted field is rather wide and is also rather intricate.

It was a sombre scene when "Heaven itself did frown upon the land." *King John*, the first of these Histories is a play that is relatively self-contained. It is story of perfidy faintly redeemed by patriotism. Indeed, it is hard to tell whether John, or Philip of France, or Pandulph the Pope's legate was the most perfidious, although John, I dare say, won by a few necks. *The Famous History of the Life of King Henry the Eighth* which ends the series and is also, pretty nearly, self-contained is, in its way, a tortuous but magnificent introduction to great Queen Bess's christening; but it is Wolsey's fall "like Lucifer" and Queen Katharine's beautiful patient fortitude that stick in the mind, bringing tears that are not tears of joy.

The other eight plays, *Richard II*, the two parts of *Henry IV*, *Henry V*, the three parts of *Henry VI*, and *Richard III* form a single connected dreadful story—dreadful despite their gleams of chivalry or glory and despite the art that gave us Falstaff, and Bardolph, and Justice Shallow, and Fluellen. When Richard banished Bolingbroke and confiscated the revenues of Lancaster (since John of Gaunt could not survive the sentence on his son), the act, so far from being statesmanlike, brought generations of disaster. Bolingbroke's return in arms, nominally to recover his dukedom and his estates, was a plain bid for the crown, and the Bishop of Carlisle, one of the few honest churchmen in these pages, foretold the meaning of the "woeful pageant" of Bolingbroke's coronation. "The woe's to come; the children yet unborn Shall feel this day as sharp to them as thorn." The house of Lancaster had tried to do what all the waters in the rough rude sea could not do; it had tried to wash the balm from an anointed king. The balm stung; and the fault had to be expiated, not indeed by an inexorable fate or pseudo-philosophy of history called the "logic of events" but in a groping, darkened development in the troubled minds of men.

Bolingbroke knew it. He turned his eyes towards a Crusade and when Hotspur's rebellion stopped that project, he had good hopes that his son Harry Monmouth, despite his brawling taproom ways, would reap in honour what had been so dishonourably sown. On his death-bed Bolingbroke said:

> God knows, my son,
> By what by-paths and indirect crook'd ways
> I met this crown; and I myself know well
> How troublesome it sat upon my head.
> To thee it shall descend with better quiet,
> Better opinion, better confirmation,
> For all the soil of the achievement goes
> With me into the earth.

It almost seemed so. Harry Monmouth re-interred Richard's bones and gave lavishly to the poor "to pardon blood." On the eve of Agincourt he prayed:

> Not to-day, O Lord,
> O, not to-day, think not upon the fault
> My father made in compassing the crown;

and if any victory could give the answer to the ordeal by battle Agincourt seemed to do so. The crowns of France and of England were to be united in Henry's son, should he have one, by a princess of France. But the reign of that son, Henry VI, gave the lie to all these hopes. Joan of Arc intervened. Henry's minority was long, his manhood all too long, more futile than saintly, though something saintly too. France was lost, England distracted, the nobles in arms, the roses, red and white, were thorny briers that rent the land. There was neither rest nor hope for England till Richard III (according to Shakespeare a mere monster of militant evil) fell on Bosworth field.

That is the general picture, and war is a major theme in all the Histories except two, one of which, the second part of *Henry IV*, is notable, nevertheless, for its recruiting scenes, the other being *Henry VIII*. What were Shakespeare's observations about these wars?

I have not noticed much that resembled a general philosophy of war in the Histories. Perhaps it would be an anachronism to expect one even from Shakespeare, at any rate from the lips of the princes, barons, politicians, and murderers who do so much of the speaking. It seems to be assumed throughout that men will be men, and so will fight in organized bodies if they are organized at all. There is talk, it is true, of the Crusades,[1] but there is no indication that wars would cease if the cross annihilated the crescent and all other heathen emblems.

That being understood we are chiefly concerned with Shakespeare's attitude to wars.

Here the first and the most noticeable point is that it is the horror of war, not its pomp and glory if it has any, that was overwhelmingly present to Shakespeare's mind. Philip the Bastard's tirade in *King John*—

> O, now doth death line his dead chaps with steel;
> The swords of soldiers are his teeth, his fangs;
> And now he feasts, mousing the flesh of men,
> In undetermined differences of kings,

is only more eloquent than the sentiments of the others. For all the

[1] It was not till 1683 that John Sobieski destroyed the Ottoman menace to Europe at Vienna.

actors, war had the brand of Cain. Indeed, it should be sufficient to remark upon the attitude of Shakespeare's greatest hero, King Henry V. That monarch was not only punctilious to obtain the blessing of the church upon his cause, but also humane. "We give express charge" he said after hearing about the malmsey-nosed Bardolph's offences, "that in our marches through the country, there be nothing compelled from the villages, nothing taken but paid for, none of the French upbraided or abused in disdainful language; for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner." Few were more sensible than he of the blessings of peace, "dear nurse of arts, plenties and joyful births." He deplored the desolation of France:

> Her vine, the merry cheerer of the heart
> Unprunèd dies; her hedges even-pleach'd
> Like prisoners wildly overgrown with hair,
> Put forth disorder'd twigs; the fallow leas
> The darnel, hemlock and rank fumitory
> Doth root upon.
>
> Even so our houses and ourselves and children
> Have lost, or do not learn for want of time
> The sciences that should become our country:
> But grow like savages—as soldiers will
> That nothing do but meditate on blood—
> To swearing and stern looks, defused attire
> And every thing that seems unnatural.

Yet it would be hard to exceed the detailed matter-of-fact savagery of Henry V's threats to the citizens of Harfleur:

> The gates of mercy shall be all shut up,
> And the flesh'd soldier, rough and hard of heart,
> In liberty of bloody hand shall range
> With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass
> Your fresh-fair virgins and your flowering infants.
> What is it, then, to me, if impious war
> Array'd in flames like to the prince of fiends,
> Do with his smirched complexion, all fell feats
> Enlik'd to waste and desolation?
>
> . . . in a moment look to see
> The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
> Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters;
> Your fathers taken by the silver beards,
> And their most reverent heads dash'd to the walls,
> Your naked infants spitted upon pikes
> Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confused
> Do break the clouds as did the wives of Jewry
> At Herod's bloody-hunting slaughtermen.

Indeed, in Shakespeare's Histories even the entry into war was, almost always, a joyless business. "Our doctors say this is no month to bleed." That is the usual story. Certainly there were adventurous spirits whose courage mounted with occasion. There was jollity in the archdeacon's house at Bangor when Hotspur, Mortimer, Glendower, and their ladies were almost ready for the great enterprise. Of general, joyful alacrity, however, there was very little, the main exception, as usual, being Henry V's campaign. Then expectation sat in the air.

> Now all the youth of England are on fire
> And silken dalliance in the wardrobe lies;
> Now thrive the armourers, and honour's thought
> Reigns solely in the breast of every man.

It being allowed, then, that war is a dreadful evil, the question arises whether war is more abhorrent in some circumstances than in others. To that question the answer of Shakespeare's Histories appears to be that civil war is the worst of all, that there is something unnatural in the presence of a foreign foe in England, and that war within Christendom is less defensible than a Crusade.

The first point needs no proof. All the Histories are massive evidence for it. "Blood against blood: self against self." The thing is summed up in Richmond's (Henry VIIth's) speech after Bosworth Field:

> England hath long been mad, and scarr'd herself;
> The brother blindly shed the brother's blood;
> The father rashly slaughter'd his own son,
> The son, compelled, been butcher to the sire.

The second point is linked with the first in the famous lines that end *King John*. England was and would be unconquerable "but when it first did help to wound itself." It is the marrow of John of Gaunt's still more celebrated speech in *Richard II*:

> This fortress built by Nature for herself
> Against infection and the hand of war
> This happy breed of men, this little world,
> This precious stone set in the silver sea
> Which serves it in the office of a wall
> Or as a moat defensive to a house.

The thought, however, is constantly recurring in the Histories. There is a mystic sanctity in what Neptune or Nature has done for England, girding her with the ocean. Salisbury says so in *King John*, the gardeners say so in *Richard II*, Warwick says so in *Henry VI*. All these speakers, it is true, were Englishmen, somewhat forgetful of the Welsh and the "weasel" Scots; but the Duke of Austria says

the same in *King John* although without any mysticism. The idea is not that England could not be invaded. On the contrary, small-scale invasions were quite common in these Histories. What is meant is that England is marked out by Nature to be self-sufficient.

The third point is much less prominent; but it exists. "Shall not you and I," said Henry V, wooing his French princess very briskly despite the language barrier, "Shall not you and I, between Saint Denis and Saint George, compound a boy, half French, half English, that shall go to Constantinople and take the Turk by the beard? shall we not? what sayest thou, my fair flower-de-luce?" In due time, the boy so compounded said the same:

> Ay, marry, uncle; for I always thought
> It was both impious and unnatural
> That such immanity and bloody strife
> Should reign among professors of one faith.

It is usually thought that war is justified when the cause of it is righteous. It is sweetened by patriotism, and burnished by martial honours. We may therefore try to question the Histories about these things.

On the point of morality it is hard to distil much good out of all this iniquity though we may perhaps discern like the royal saint (who was always lucid in Shakespeare's pages) that "things ill got have ever bad success." The plain fact is that all the combatants, whatever their treachery or ambition, called confidently and cheerfully upon God and St. George to fortify their arms. There were a few honest men among them, or, at any rate, men who were indifferent honest; but most of the leaders forswore their oaths, double-crossed their friends, were "crafty-sick" when the crisis was rather too critical, murdered without compunction or (worse) with it, and in all sorts of other ways offended against the simplest moral codes. They committed the oldest sins the newest kind of ways. Indeed, it is with a sense of relief that we find some few of them abandoning all moral pretences. When John says sanctimoniously, "Our strong possession and our right for us," his mother, Elinor, says frankly, "Your strong possession much more than your right." Edward of York was equally frank: "But for a kingdom any oath may be broken; I would break a thousand oaths to reign one year." Of Richard III's various sayings about conscience the Thrasymachean sentiment:

> Conscience is but a word that cowards use
> Devised at first to keep the strong in awe

rings the truest. In short it is unprofitable to pursue this aspect of the matter. Henry V, an exception as usual, obtained the blessing of Canterbury and of Ely upon his claim to the throne of France,

but his dying father, according to Shakespeare, had given him the sinister charge, "Therefore, my Harry, Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels."

I have already said something about patriotism in connection with Nature's or Neptune's intentions. As Hastings put it: "Let us be back'd with God and with the seas Which he hath given us for fence impregnable." But I shall add some further remarks.

Truculent patriotism was common enough. Any one English soldier was held to be the equal of a considerable though finite number of Frenchmen. The English were said to win their fights when they were starving, thus refuting the slander that their courage was just meat-extract. There was plenty of truculent patriotism in Richard III's oration to his soldiers:

> Let's whip these stragglers o'er the seas again;
> Lash hence these overweening rags of France,
> These famished beggars, weary of their lives;
> Who, but for dreaming on this fond exploit,
> For want of means, poor rats, had hang'd themselves:
> If we be conquered, let men conquer us,
> And not these bastard Bretons; whom our fathers
> Have in their own land beaten, bobb'd and thumped
> And in record left them the heirs of shame.

Nor was the truculence necessarily hollow. Cœur de Lion's bastard (*né* Faulconbridge), who spoke the concluding lines in *King John* was a born adventurer, a "rash, inconsiderate fiery voluntary" who was so incensed at the negotiated peace that, railing against "Commodity" (i.e. accommodation, compromise, or appeasement) he concluded "Since kings break faith upon commodity, Gain, be my lord, for I will worship thee." Nevertheless, despite all his swagger, Philip the Bastard served his king with unflinching loyalty, and firmly believed that naught would make us rue if England were only true to herself. His royal master was a patriot too, not on the easiest lines since he challenged the Pope.

> Tell him this tale; and from the mouth of England
> Add this much more, that no Italian priest
> Shall tithe or toll in our dominions:
> But as we, under heaven, are supreme head,
> So under Him that great supremacy
> Where we do reign, we will alone uphold,
> Without the assistance of a mortal hand.

Patriotism of the deeper sort, the twining of the roots of a man's being in the dear and friendly soil of his native land is everywhere present in the Histories. Since it is subtle and seldom vaunts itself it is the more difficult to illustrate. I shall give but one example here, Mowbray's speech on his banishment by Richard of Bordeaux:

A dearer merit, not so deep a maim
As to be cast forth in the common air
Have I deserved at your highness' hands.
The language I have learned these forty years,
My native English, now I must forgo:
And now my tongue's use is to me no more
Than an unstringed viol or a harp,
Or like a cunning instrument cased up,
Or, being open, put into his hands
That knows no touch to tune the harmony.

I am too old to fawn upon a nurse,
Too far in years to be a pupil now;
What is thy sentence, then, but speechless death,
Which robs my tongue from breathing native breath?

Let us turn from patriotism to martial honour. What have the Histories to tell us about that?

Martial honour is pretty different from common morality, but can seldom afford to be so completely dissociated from it as in the high-born ruffians who fill so many of these pages. Even in a military sense York and Somerset could scarcely be excused for their selfish failure to support Talbot, or Northumberland for his prudent sickness when Hotspur put all to the touch. It is impossible to conjoin any sort of honour with the career of Cardinal Beaufort or much with Bolingbroke who, having persuaded Exton to murder Richard of Bordeaux, coolly told the murderer that "they love not poison that do poison need" and bade him, wageless, "with Cain go wander thorough shades of night."

These things are so clear that it is needless to do more than mention them. In the chaos of the times something more primitive than honour took the reins. "Thy father killed my father: therefore die."

On the other hand, there are beautiful scenes of chivalry and daring. Hotspur, though not quite disinterested, deserved all his conqueror's praise: "This earth that bears thee dead, Bears not alive so stout a gentleman." Hotspur loved honour bravely and dearly:

Send danger from the east unto the west,
So honour cross it from the north to south,
And let them grapple: O, the blood more stirs
To rouse a lion than to start a hare.

Or again, when his father did not march:

I rather of his absence make this use,
It lends a lustre and more great opinion,
A larger dare to our great enterprise,
Than if the earl were here.

Consider again the scene on the field of Agincourt when York, dying, espies the corpse of Suffolk:

> Tarry, dear cousin Suffolk!
> My soul shall thine keep company to heaven;
> Tarry, sweet soul, for mine, then fly abreast,
> As in this glorious and well-foughten field
> We kept together in our chivalry.

Or the Talbots, father and son:

> Where is my other life, mine own is gone:
> O, where's young Talbot? Where is valiant John?
> Triumphant death, smear'd with captivity,
> Young Talbot's valour makes me smile at thee. . . .
> O thou whose wounds become hard-favour'd death,
> Speak to thy father ere thou yield thy breath;
> Brave death by speaking, whether he will or no:
> Imagine him a Frenchman and thy foe. . . .
> Soldiers adieu! I have what I would have
> Now my old arms are young John Talbot's grave.

The ruffians notwithstanding, there were many who could say with Mowbray:

> Mine honour is my life; both grow in one;
> Take honour from me, and my life is done:
> Then, dear my liege, mine honour let me try:
> In that I live and for that will I die.

That is one side of the shield but Shakespeare, with spacious equity, knew that there was another side and that many believed that honour, too, was vanity.

The dying Hotspur himself was almost a witness:

> O Harry, thou hast robb'd me of my youth;
> I better brook the loss of brittle life
> Than those proud titles thou hast won of me:
> They wound my thoughts worse than thy sword my flesh:
> But thought's the slave of life, and life time's fool:
> And time that takes survey of all the world,
> Must have a stop.

The dying Warwick was still more explicit:

> Why, what is pomp, rule, reign, but earth and dust?
> And, live we how we can, yet die we must.

The living could say these things as well as the dying, and one of the most philosophical of them all was Henry V before Agincourt:

> And what have kings, that privates have not too,
> Save ceremony, save general ceremony?
> And what art thou, thou idle ceremony?
> What kind of god art thou, that suffer'st more
> Of mortal griefs than do thy worshippers?

What are thy rents? What are thy comings-in?
O ceremony, show me but thy worth?
What is thy soul of adoration?
Art thou aught else but place, degree and form,
Creating awe and fear in other men?
Wherein thou art less happy, being fear'd
Than they in fearing.
What drink'st thou oft, instead of homage sweet,
But poison'd flattery. O, be sick, great greatness,
And bid thy ceremony give thee cure.
Think'st thou the fiery fever will go out
With titles blown from adulation?
Will it give place to flexure and low bending?
Canst thou, when thou command'st the beggar's knee,
Command the health of it? No, thou proud dream. . . .

This Henry, before he was crowned, had a friend, a gross and lovable friend, a knight called John Falstaff, which Falstaff was also a philosopher with very clear views about honour and the worth of it. All the world knows them, and yet they insist upon being quoted. Falstaff's shortest statement was: "I like not such grinning honour as Sir Walter hath; give me life: which if I can save, so: if not, honour comes unlooked for, and there's an end." At greater length he said: "Well, 'tis no matter; honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come on? How then? Can honour set to a leg? No: Or an arm? No: Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that word honour? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? He that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. 'Tis insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon; and so ends my catechism."

Up to the present I have said very little about the part that women played in these Histories. It may now be said that they seldom softened the scenes. Katharine (of Aragon) certainly did. There was never a gentler, a more queenly queen:

Do what you will, my lords; and pray forgive me,
If I have used myself unmannerly;
You know I am a woman lacking wit
To make a seemly answer to such persons.
Pray do my service to his majesty:
He has my heart yet; and shall have my prayers
While I shall have my life.

And there were other exceptions. Richard of Bordeaux's queen (she was really his child-wife) is gentler in her sorrow than Richard, just as perplexed as he but without the clashing blades of dialectic that tore his heart in pieces. The Duchess of York (in *Richard II*) was

less of a stoic than her "sour" husband. The agonies that many of these ladies had to endure excused and indeed required an extravagance of grief. Thus Constance in *King John*:

> I am not mad; this hair I tear is mine;
> My name is Constance; I was Geffrey's wife:
> Young Arthur is my son, and he is lost;
> I am not mad; I would to heaven I were
> For then 'tis like I should forget myself:
> O, if I could, what grief should I forget!—
> Preach some philosophy to make me mad.

The story of Hotspur, again, was as tender as it was gallant when Kate, his wife, came into it:

> *Kate.* Do you not love me? Do you not indeed?
> Well, do not then; for since you love me not
> I will not love myself. Do you not love me?
> Nay, tell me if you speak in jest or no?
> *Hotspur.* Come, wilt thou see me ride?
> And when I am o' horseback, I will swear
> I love thee infinitely.

And thus she mourned him:

> He was indeed the glass
> Wherein the noble youth did dress themselves:
> He had no legs that practised not his gait:
> And speaking thick, which nature made his blemish,
> Became the accents of the valiant;
> For those that could speak low and tardily
> Would turn their own perfection to abuse,
> To seem like him; so that in speech, in gait,
> In diet, in affections of delight
> In military rules, humours of blood,
> He was the mark and glass, copy and book,
> That fashioned others.

Despite such exceptions the female of the species, in these Histories, was just as ambitious as the male. Humphrey of Gloucester's duchess, not Humphrey himself, aimed at the crown. The cynical "Old Lady" in *Henry VIII* knew precisely what Anne Bullen's disclaimers were worth. Lady Grey was very easily persuaded by Edward IV. The incredible Richard III found his successful wooing of the Lady Anne altogether incredible:

> Was ever woman in this humour woo'd?
> Was ever woman in this humour won?
> What, I that killed her husband and his father,
> To take her in her heart's extremest hate,
> With curses in her mouth, tears in her eyes,
> The bleeding witness of her hatred by.

> Having God her conscience and these bars against me,
> And I nothing to back my suit at all
> But the plain devil and dissembling looks,
> And yet to win her!

But even that was less incredible than his later matrimonial venture when in another short and cataclysmal interview he persuaded Edward IV's queen to favour his suit for her daughter and his niece, he having murdered her sons in the Tower, as she and all the world knew.

Indeed, some of the females in these Histories were preternaturally tough. I need not speak of Joan of Arc. It was her business to be preternaturally tough. In Shakespeare's rather disappointing study of her she is a shrewd and valiant witch, persuaded of her supernatural origin and, at the final scene, disdainful of her natural father and unscrupulous in her pleas. But consider some of the others. Elinor, John's mother, that "Ate" was, as we have seen, an entirely implacable exponent of *Realpolitik*. And what, but one thing, can one think of Margaret, Regnier's daughter and queen to King Henry VI? Was she not (as Shakespeare pictures her) fairly described as an "Amazonian trull"? Certainly she had much to live down in her youth and in her later life she had much to endure. The marriage was Suffolk's doing. He meant it for intrigue in more senses than one. To the grief and dismay of all England, plain as well as gentle, her dowerless marriage meant also the loss of the French provinces, an overdraft in place of credit. She had every right, later, to scorn her feeble husband for disinheriting their son; and, later still, to revile her son's murderers:

> O Ned, sweet Ned, speak to thy mother, boy!
> Canst thou not speak? O traitors, murderers!
> They that stabbed Caesar shed no blood at all
> Did not offend, nor were not worthy blame
> If this foul deed were by to equal it.
> He was a man; this in respect a child.
> And men ne'er spend their fury on a child.
> What's worse than murderer that I may name it?

But what a dreadful woman she was, and how foul a murderess herself, conspiring with Suffolk and Cardinal Beaufort for the ruthless murder of Gloucester the Protector, baiting York in a very transport of malevolence before she and Clifford stabbed him, crowning him with a paper crown, taunting him with the death of Rutland his son!

> Look, York; I stain'd this napkin with the blood
> That valiant Clifford, with his rapier's point,
> Made issue from the bosom of the boy;
> And if thine eyes can water for his death,
> I give thee this to dry thy cheeks withal.

Alas, poor York, but that I hate thee deadly,
I should lament thy miserable state.
I prithee, grieve, to make me merry, York.
What, hath thy fiery heart so parch'd thine entrails,
That not a tear can fall for Rutland's death?
Why art thou patient, man? Thou shouldst be mad;
And I, to make thee mad, do mock thee thus.

In comparison with all this it is but a small thing that she should later say to York's widow:

Bear with me. I am hungry for revenge
And now I cloy me with beholding it.

In all this discussion I have been dealing with the great and with their ideas, and have said little or nothing about the war-mind of the common man.

That is in keeping with the tenor of the Histories. For nearly all the actors, the common people, were what Archbishop Scroop called them in the play, "the fond many." They were feared quite often. Richard of Bordeaux complained of the hold Bolingbroke had upon their affections. (In actual history Richard had been rather successful in the matter of Wat Tyler, but in the play we hear, not about that, but about the way in which the populace pelted him with mud when Bolingbroke triumphed.) Margaret "the Amazonian trull" was afraid of the regard that the common people had for Humphrey of Gloucester. But although the common people were feared they were seldom even flattered. They just didn't count unless, like Jack Cade, they were pawns in a bigger game. Richard III's statement may sound rather different:

The world is grown so bad
That wrens make play where eagles dare not perch.
Since every Jack became a gentleman
There's many a gentle person made a Jack.

But Richard's "Jacks" were just the relatives of Edward IV's Queen, the "Lady Grey." The "Jacks" of Jack Cade's rabblement were very different beings (and Cade professed himself a Plantagenet). Indeed, the Cade episode in *Henry VI* is primarily a rollicking satire on Communism. "There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a penny; the three-hooped pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make it felony to drink small beer; and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass. . . . There shall be no money; all shall eat and drink on my score, and I will apparel them all in one livery that they may agree like brothers and worship me like God." There was another side to Cade, it is true:

> And you that love the commons, follow me.
> Now show yourselves men; 'tis for liberty
> We will not leave one lord, one gentleman;
> Spare none but go in clouted shoon;
> For they are thrifty honest men and such
> As would, but that they dare not, take our parts:

but that other side had very little scope in the play.

Occasionally we hear something about the attitude of the common people in a semi-official way when a citizen, a tutor, a mayor, a scrivener, sentinels, gardeners, pot-boys, and a hired murderer or two play the part of chorus. Hence we learn things that, in general, would not be very hard to guess: that the citizens were profoundly disturbed, "All may be well; but, if God sort it so, 'Tis more than we deserve or I expect"; that they were not deceived, *teste* the scrivener who engrossed the indictment of Hastings before Hastings was arrested, "Why who's so gross, That seeth not this palpable device?"; that high taxes were unpopular, "Tongues spit their duties out, and cold hearts freeze Allegiance in them"; that the loss of France rankled bitterly in every English breast save perhaps in a careerist's like Suffolk's (and a soured sea-captain put paid to Suffolk's account). We also learn enough (scarcely too much) of the general misery, one of the more dramatic instances being the scene where Henry VI, sitting lonely on a hill while the battle raged, and fondly supposing that "humble swains" had only to count the time as he was doing at that moment, mingled his maudlin tears with the hot tears of two pressed men, a father who had unwittingly slain his son, and a son who had unwittingly slain his father.

On the general philosophy of the plain man's duty in war, the most solid contribution comes, as usual, from Henry V. That gallant prince in the dark night of waiting before zero-hour at Agincourt went about incognito among his soldiery and had a long discussion with three soldiers, Bates, Court, and Williams. Bates's attitude was that, be the cause just or no, simple obedience was a subject's duty "If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us." Williams, who had said, "That's more than we know," when Henry had asserted the justice of the cause, was more argumentative. The king in his opinion had a heavy reckoning for all who died in sin, "some swearing, some crying for a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left." To this Henry replied, *imprimis*, that the king was not responsible for "particular endings" in the affair and did not purpose individual deaths when he purposed individual services; *secundo*, that "if it come to the arbitrament of swords, no king, be his cause never so spotless, can try it out with all unspotted soldiers"; *deinde*, that war was God's

beadle, and the king, having committed his obedient soldiers into the beadle's charge, could leave the individual soldier's conscience to a personal arrangement between the soldier and the beadle. The debate ended on a less philosophical note, namely with a (postponed) challenge from Williams to Henry, since Williams obstinately persisted in his belief that the king would be ransomed if the rest of them had their throats cut, and the disguised Henry resented the imputation.

For the rest we have Shakespeare's vivid incidentals to instruct us, and principally the Falstaff scenes. We have Captain Bardolph and Corporal Nym flaunting their military titles. We have "Let us to France, like horse-leeches, my boys. To suck, to suck, the very blood to suck" from Ancient Pistol. We learn about the temporary drop in unemployment. "What! A young knave and begging? Is there not wars? Is there not employment? Doth not the king lack subjects? Do not the rebels need soldiers?" We learn also about Falstaff's recruiting methods (worth £350 to him) in the Hotspur rebellion. "I press me none but good householders, yeomen's sons; inquire me out contracted bachelors, such as had been asked twice on the banns; such a commodity of warm slaves as had as lieve hear the devil as a drum; such as fear the report of a caliver worse than a struck fowl or a hurt wild duck. I pressed me none but such toasts-and-butter, with hearts in their bellies no bigger than pins' heads, and they have bought out their services." He repeated the method later with Mouldy, Wart, and the rest, and he almost deserved to get away with it; for what would match the impudent cynicism of his reply to the Prince when his rabble were on the march: "Tut, tut; good enough to toss; food for powder, food for powder; they'll fill a pit as well as better: tush man, mortal men, mortal men."

If little is said in the Histories about the common man, less still is said about the common woman, but I may end this narrative with the mention of a *very* common woman, Doll Tearsheet. "Come, I'll be friends with thee, Jack; thou art going to the wars, and whether I shall ever see thee again or no, there is nobody cares." We remember her again a little later when her gross, grizzled, jolly, inimitable admirer had "a dozen captains" calling for him: "I cannot speak; if my heart be not ready to burst—well, sweet Jack, have a care of thyself."

SEPARATION AND REINTEGRATION AS PHASES OF EVOLUTION

H. KALMUS

NEW concepts, or new and better formulations of old concepts, are essential for scientific progress. This paper is intended to focus attention on two phases of natural processes and human activities which have a variety of names, and by giving them neutral names, to deprive them of their emotional flavour. As a result I hope that two evolutionary principles of some generality will become apparent.

A process in which part of a body becomes more or less separated from the rest and starts to develop autonomously according to a pattern of its own, I call *separation* (*autonomy, emancipation*). By *reintegration* I mean the reverse process whereby the separated and developed structure reunites with the main body, which has itself developed in the meantime.

The most complex structure capable of analysis is *human society*, the development of which provides us with numerous examples of separation and reintegration. Opinions differ as to the state of human society in prehistoric times, but many authors have described the development of tribes and their (subsequent) merging. It is easier to analyse the growth and development of City States, e.g. in Greece, and their subsequent fusion into confederations or their overthrow by a stronger and more centralized power. The initial separation of these City-units from a larger and not very highly organized whole is usually considered as positive evolution, and some of the constitutions thus developed are very elaborate. After a time, however, the fields of development open to such isolated entities become exhausted and further progress impossible. All these Cities sooner or later decayed or reunited with a larger entity. At the present time, when the material means of integrating all political units into a single World Commonwealth can be envisaged, the problems of separation and reintegration are of the utmost importance. Their names and manifestations differ in different places, for example "Little England" as opposed to "Empire," "Federation" and "New Order" as against "Re-establishment of Sovereign States" in Europe, "Isolationism" as against "Participation in World Affairs" in America, and so on. It is perhaps significant that in the present conflict each party claims to be the important whole, whereas the "other" is the unimportant bit.

The *institutions of Society*, based largely on tradition, provide innu-

merable examples of both phases. In particular they show the clear advantage of specialization, and at a later stage the danger of concentrated power. The Army and other war machines, or the Police Force, are examples of this. But even the monopoly of knowledge by universities, learned societies, research institutions, etc., lead not only to much appreciated advantages, but progressively more to misuse.

The development of *social classes* results in an increasing organization and social usefulness in the early stages, but after a while classes degenerate, their behaviour becomes rigid, and they lose their useful function. Many people consider that most modern states have outlived their period of usefulness, and that they should be replaced by a World Union of smaller regional units. On the other hand, overemphasis on the emancipation of the individual, commonly called freedom, always leads to anarchy.

The development of *language* provides many examples of separation and reintegration. For instance, an early step in its development was probably the separation of single words from inarticulate noises, as happens in childhood. These individual words were first associated with very special objects, such as a particular man or tree, later developing a more general meaning. However, after using these simple words for some time, primitive people had to reintegrate them into sentences, as a child does.

Compound words constitute another example. Once single roots are exhausted, the need to indicate interrelations briefly necessitated a reintegration in the form of compound words. After a time the meaning of such words frequently becomes divorced from their original one, and their compound origin may be completely lost sight of. The increasing complexity of activities leads to the formation of secondary compounds, and so on. This process may go to great lengths, as in classical Greek and modern German. The Chinese, on the other hand, managed to get on with monosyllabic words, though this has the disadvantage that each syllable may mean almost anything. The two opposing tendencies of creating compounds and of using "simple" words are apparent in any living language, as, for example, in contemporary English.

Separation, leading to autonomy, especially when it concerns social institutions, has often been described as a change from a means to an end. Such a teleological definition is quite useful for a popular demonstration of this evolutionary phase. (However, the reverse change from ends to means is equally important.) Money affords a striking example of this. Its development as a common denominator for all goods was an enormous improvement on the old system of barter, which, however, has not entirely disappeared. At present we are witnessing the breakdown of a highly perfected but "in-

human" finance system, parallel with the dethroning of money. By this I do not mean bankruptcy of a currency, but the restrictions imposed on the use of money by most governments, ranging from the dozen or more kinds of mark in pre-war Germany and the prohibition of export of roubles, together with the restricted purchasing power for Russian goods, to the enforced sale of foreign currencies in this country. However, it is perhaps worth noting that money has not been abolished in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and that banking techniques have been incorporated in their administration.

The contributions of separation, followed by specialization, to the development of *objects of human activity* can be studied in its bearing on all kinds of activities, important or trivial. The separation of music, dancing, poetry, prose and so on, from a common religious basis has enormously increased their techniques. Phases of separation and reintegration can easily be followed in a single art as we know it to-day. The development of drawing and painting from ritual or narrative cave drawings via the Italian school to *l'art pour l'art* cubism and (back) to political cartoons indicates quite clearly the conflict of the esoteric and exoteric tendencies. This also is fully paralleled by analogous developments in music. The modern film, which utilizes developments in many fields of art and science represents a most important experiment in their integration. Its limitation probably lies in the impossibility of bringing the audience (as a more acting partner) into the synthesis.

Modern *industry* exists by virtue of the reintegration of many technologies developed separately by different craftsmen. Motor cars, for example, are usually manufactured in one factory, just as the most primitive carts were built in one workshop. But the enormously increased efficiency of the modern vehicle depends on the collaboration of the draftsman, the engineer, the chemist, the upholsterer, and dozens of others.

The development of *postage stamps* affords an example of the effects of separation and reintegration. None will deny that this development, although it may have lead to numerous small abuses, has provided us with interesting and more beautiful stamps.

Science as a whole also shows phases of separation from man's social activities and other phases of reintegration. The advocates of so-called "pure" science think that progress depends on a high degree of divorce of science from everyday life. The term "applied" science—or more emotionally, "living" science—indicates the opposite, or unifying tendency. Both principles can also be studied in any one *branch of science*. The need for a technique, say in the observation of small objects, has led to the development of a new branch of science, microscopy. In its development all sight of the original

purpose had been lost for long periods, but the end-product is nevertheless the highly efficient modern microscope. Specialization over too long a period may often lead to sterility, but it is very difficult to decide whether or not reintegration of highly specialized work is likely to occur. The mathematical work of Riemann is a good example. For many years it was known only to a few specialists and was considered very remote from reality, but later it became an integral part of modern physics by hastening the development of theories of relativity.

Separation and reintegration follow each other in the development of any scientific *hypothesis*. The first step, usually taken unconsciously, is to determine the field where it is applicable, and to isolate it. In this way a theory may develop to great perfection, for example the theory of the motion of the planets. However, its importance can only be measured by the extent it can be generalized, for example, the development of classical mechanics from astronomy.

There is also a danger of this reintegration starting too soon, that is to say, before the theory has developed fully in isolation. And the broader the field covered by the hypothesis the greater this danger. Idealism affords some striking examples. Plato's concept of a world of ideas constituting a reality, separated from the world of flux and change, was certainly an important contribution to the history of thought in so far as it emphasizes conscious abstraction, which forms an essential part of all higher human activities. However, nostalgic longings for the ideal world as well as the complacent contentment of the sage who "dwells in it" are both rather unhappy attitudes. In a cruder way, Rosenberg's "Nordic world-soul" is having the most disastrous consequences for humanity to-day.

The phenomenon of *life* always shows separation and reintegration. Living organisms are aggregates of material which obey rather specialized laws. In particular they show a local independence of entropy, and the further evolution proceeds the more "improbable" becomes the structures and processes which emerge. At the borderline between living and non-living matter, separation is clearly apparent. A virus may be regarded as a sort of super-molecule with the peculiar ability of reproducing itself to give further molecules of like structure.

An individual organism, for example a tree or a man, exhibits a high degree of separation, usually summed up in the term "individual." Numerous examples are, however, known of reintegration of individuals into larger units. Such are the colony-forming animals: corals, siphonophora, and some bryozoa and tunicata, or symbiotic organisms which are no longer capable of independent existence. The social insects show a fair loss of individual capacity through reintegration. At the lower end of the scale there must have been

numerous developmental phases which may be regarded as phases of separation. We do not know whether or when the first cells separated from a living slime, but we can see how the nucleus becomes perfected when differentiated from the cell, the germ plasm separately from the soma, and how one chromosome develops independently of another.

In *phylogenesis* the autonomy of organs leading to specialization—sometimes called orthogenesis—frequently ends in the over-development of an organ or a system, and the species will die unless harmony is restored by reintegration. Or harmony may be maintained by the emancipation of larval forms which mature before the unbalanced stage is reached.

There is a certain parallel between the development of the brain and mental evolution. After the perfection of isolated "instincts" and "reflexes" more integrated types of human behaviour have developed simultaneously with large areas of the brain solely employed in the integration of these mechanisms.

The segmentation of an ovum shows both antagonistic tendencies at the same time. Clearly segmentation itself is a form of separation; on the other hand, the cells produced must also act as a reintegrated unit in their embryonic and post-embryonic life.

In *developmental physiology* autonomous and integrated forms of development have been distinguished as predetermined development ("mosaic type") as opposed to epigenetic development. The first type, found, for example, in Arthropods, shows an early determination of the embryonic material so that cell material which would normally develop into an extremity will do so wherever it is implanted experimentally. In an organism developing epigenetically, on the other hand, transplantation can affect the fate of the embryonic material. For example, tail-buds in vertebrates can develop into limbs, and vice versa. Recent investigation has shown that some organs of a group commonly regarded as epigenetic, may separate early, and conversely, integrated development may occur in forms where development is generally of the mosaic type.

The emancipation of *morphological, physiological,* and *psychological mechanisms* is frequently very striking. Horns, antlers and spurs are thought to have developed primarily as weapons in the fight for the possession of a mate These have now lost their original function, as have the dances and other mating rituals ("display") of animals. In man also many erotic habits have become almost completely separated from their original purpose of facilitating propagation. In all renaissance movements there is a demand for the reintegration of erotic elements into the general pattern of society.

Examples of separation are at once apparent in many psychopathic abnormalities. For example, in schizophrenia there is a splitting off

of an emotional or intellectual part of the personality, while persons suffering from manic-depressive insanity showing an alternation of quick, euphoric phases with slower, melancholic periods, may appear almost like two different people The distinction between pathological monomaniacs and so-called "great" maniacs largely depends on the ability of the patients to reintegrate their emancipated ideas into the mental life of their contemporaries and on the use which the existing society has for such ideas A historical study of the development of religions shows that this ability differs in different periods.

It is perhaps worthy of note that the only plausible hypothesis (apart from fraud) advanced to explain so-called *parapsychological phenomena* is based on the assumption that a part of the personality becomes autonomous, and acts as an entity, either before or after death.

Other pathological processes provide examples of different degrees of autonomy. Inflammation may be due to a variety of causes, but it will usually develop in a few stereotyped ways. It may become sufficiently divorced from its purpose as a healing mechanism to kill the individual affected. The aetiology of most malignant tumours is not known, but they are all characterized by the "wild," non-integrated growth of part of an organism which is ultimately destroyed. It is interesting to note that most malignant tumours in man develop after the reproduction age, so that there is little selection to counterbalance the fatal emancipation.

The phylogenetic development of (more perfected) organs by autonomous development has already been mentioned The sense organs of animals constitute a good example. They show how part of an organism developing in close interrelation with environmental factors will show peculiarities in construction not found in other organs. Organs may sometimes mirror physical laws. In geometrical optics, for example, any optical system can work in both directions, and certain types of eye are of very similar construction to some luminous organs, which have indeed been erroneously described as eyes.

Modern *genetics* has shown how a new species may arise by the splitting of some individuals from the mating system of an older species. This separation may be due to environmental obstacles, for example the geographical isolation of island or lake forms, or the ecological separation due to a difference of hosts, as in parasites. It may also be due to sudden changes in the chromosome mechanism which render fertilization between the original and the new set of chromosomes impossible, as in autopolyploid plants. On the other hand, allo-heteropolyploidy, that is to say, the union of two diploid chromosome sets, is an example of reintegration where split forms

reunite. This process, which has led to the production of many new and valuable culture plants, seems in turn to provide new possibilities for separation. The preponderance of chromosome numbers like 4, 8, 12, 16, 24, 48, etc., seems to indicate that in the evolution of many plants phases of separation and reintegration have alternated in the past.

It is remarkable that all races of *Homo sapiens* are fully fertile with one another, in spite of the fact that the various geographical forms were subject to considerable ecological diversity, apparently exceeding that of most species. Modern conditions are breaking down many barriers, thus destroying the old local mating systems. The United States of America contains thoroughly mixed European and African populations. It is very probable that the Germans, in spite of their racial theories, have also increased the mixing of European populations.

Separation and reintegration, particularly the latter, are difficult to trace in *inorganic nature*, as evolutionary processes are hard to detect. However, these two evolutionary phases are very closely paralleled by many physical and chemical processes. That many structures tend to become stabilized and maintain their stability in face of environmental disturbances is in accordance with the well-known principle of Le Chatelier. Inertia itself can only be conceived of in respect of separated structures. The formation of atoms, molecules, crystals, or even vast aggregates of materia such as stars from smaller units is always a separation of local structures from a general less structured simpler state. However, it seems that in inorganic nature the reintegration of the separate resultant units into the general pattern usually results in a complete loss of the complexity achieved during the separation period and the process is thus identical with *disintegration*. The combination of many atoms to form large molecules whereby only some of the acquired properties are lost may perhaps be regarded as evolutionary reintegration.

Although it is common for a separated part to reintegrate with the developing body from which it originally split off unions may sometimes occur with quite new structures or at places quite remote from where the separation originally occurred. Parasitism and symbiosis are examples of a fusion of parts never previously united. To take a mathematical instance some machines can be used for purposes for which they were never intended, as, for example, the use of certain modern accounting machines for the calculation of functions and highly complex mathematical tables. In fact, in the realm of practical science most inventions developed for a particular purpose have found application in quite unexpected fields.

In the evolution of large groups of organisms and in the progress of human society, separation and reintegration are always going on

concurrently. However, there are periods when one predominates. A student of contemporary history would in all probability see a period of reintegration ahead.

If scientists are to play an important part in the further development of humanity, they must first break down the barriers between the sciences and reintegrate their activities into one science. Then they may be in a better position to reintegrate reason and reality. Such a development is not only possible, but, I submit, unavoidable. There have already been several attempts at a unification of the sciences, the most successful of which appears to be the quantitative approach (usually called mathematical). But as the limitations of this attempt become more apparent, so the number of other possibilities of reintegration increase. It seems that in nature there exist relations between properties of a non-quantitative kind, comparable to relations in projective geometry or topology. These would provide the basis for a new reintegration of knowledge which is at present widely scattered.

Readers of this article will not perhaps think it paradoxical if I conclude by saying that I expect the greatest contributions to science in the next few decades to come from those who specialize in integration, just as I think that the most important contributions in the social sphere will come from those who organize social activities.

TYRANNY AND GROUP LOYALTIES

Dr. K. J. NEUMANN

William James in his *Problems of Philosophy* speaks about the Faith Ladder, enumerating a whole scale of standpoints individuals are likely to take with respect to a particular view of the world from "there is nothing absurd in a certain view of the world being true, nothing contradicting," up to the remark "It must be true," or "It shall be true, at any rate true for me."

It has been widely noticed that this last attitude in almost unchanged form was one of the milestones to the unified pattern of Nazi thought, and from 1933 up to the present day it has been echoed by the supporters of the "New Order" whenever the credenda and miranda of Nazism were in question. In most countries which turned towards Authoritarianism, the adoption of this attitude marked the very moment at which the hope of peace and reconciliation disappeared and the hopeless alternative between unconditioned submission to Tyranny and the firing squad remained. It has been in history the motto of some of the cruellest wars and civil conflagrations. It will in future be a valuable symptom for anyone wanting to diagnose the trends of social development. On the other hand this matter is of vital topical importance. For there is no hope of breaking the spell of Nazism over the German people until the origin of this state of mind has been found, and until methods for its destruction have been devised.

If we call the words "It shall be true, at any rate true for me," irrational, we have found an excellent description of this kind of thought, but we have done little to analyse it and nothing to find its origin, not to mention suitable counter-measures.

A man will not argue in this way unless he values his attachments and obligations to a particular creed infinitely more than his own capacity of rational thought. A further condition for such an argument is the assumption on his part that this creed is hostile to the results of his rational reflection.

Such a diagnosis should call for a thorough investigation into the different degrees of intensity which these attachments and obligations can assume. In social life we call them "loyalties."

(1) Not nearly enough attention has been paid to the nature of these loyalties. This is not surprising, as their influence is much less visible in static and secure times. Up to 1914 social science, under the impact of Utilitarianism, was inclined to follow Ratzenhofer in taking "interests" as the main motives of social action. After 1918

social and national insecurity left deeper marks in Central than in Western Europe, and it was in Central Europe, therefore, that some of the deeper trends of human nature became more visible.

It is naturally difficult in times of security to distinguish between interests and loyalties, because the relations of the individual to groups and associations, and of associations to the community, will then seem harmonious. The harmonious co-ordination of the various associations within the community will rarely allow a challenge to his loyalty to this or that association to arise. The consequence is that the individual in the well-ordered society assumes himself to be acting purely according to his own interest and will.

(2) There is nothing in a well-ordered society to prevent a citizen from being at the same time a loyal member of the State and of one of the religious bodies within the State. He is free to join a Trade Union, whichever of the political parties he most inclines to, a Sports Club, a Literary or any other voluntary society, according to his taste. When, for instance, the same man stands during the National Anthem, applauds the Chairman's speech at the local Trade Union meeting, repeats the Creed during Divine Service, or selects his candidate at a Parliamentary election, we cannot say that a different mind actuates him on each of these separate occasions, involving as they do somewhat dissimilar activities. The homage he pays during the National Anthem seems at any rate to indicate a specialized function of the mind on that occasion, namely that function in terms of which his relation to his nation may be determined; and if this specialized function of his mind arises out of a complex of emotions and interests positively attached to the nation or State, we have an example of a loyalty.

In static and secure times, the individual's adherence to a religious creed, political party or trade union, by no means involves disloyalty to the State. Fresh from the homage a man has paid by standing during the National Anthem, he can go on to his Union meeting and pay the same respect to the "Internationale." But these relations, if they appear static in times of security, are liable even then to fluctuate. The allegiance of an individual will be frequently unevenly divided between the enthusiasm for religion and an interest in politics. Sometimes, i.e. in the life of the same individual, the National or orthodox Church has the ascendancy, sometimes other smaller unorthodox bodies. A man may begin life with an ardent interest in politics, join the Army and become a resolute patriot, and finally spend his old age as a religious fanatic.

(3) Even under normal circumstances it can easily be recognized that the appreciations which the individual has for his relations to different groups and associations, differ in degree. They will differ according to his early environment, his social class, occupation and

education, according to the kind of life he lives and the books he reads. Often when he prefers one particular relation to the other, it will appear to him as a matter of rational inference. If he, for instance, at a time of a national emergency puts all his peacetime interests aside to dedicate himself to the cause of his country, he will argue with full justification that it is a matter of common sense that the defence of the common weal is more important than his everyday interests.

And yet it is true that an individual may sometimes leave a political party at the request of a secret society; or he may leave a secret society at the request of the clergy; or he may abandon his religious community at the request of a political leader (see C. J. Hayes: *Essays on Nationalism*). This seems to indicate not only that all the loyalties are not of the same value to individuals, but also that the same loyalty changes its value at certain times and under certain circumstances. It appears also that the individual mind has some sort of scale, a kind of hierarchy of values, to which loyalties can be related. Some evidence for this assumption can be found in the "Field" theory of modern Psychology (see also Bleuler: *Autistic Thought*). It is, however, important to realize that the elements of the hierarchy of values do not form water-tight compartments, being integral parts of the individual mind. Moreover, it is quite safe to assume that all or most of the hierarchy belongs to a particular part of the mind, that is the part with which the individual helps to form social groups. According to Simmel, those are the parts with which the individual helps to contribute to the "nivellement" (levelling), which is the condition of group and mass attitudes.

Among the elements which usually figure very high within the hierarchy of values, one particular set can be seen to be more powerful than the other elements. Some of the loyalties are so much ingrained in our whole system of social behaviour that their commands are often not regarded as our own wishes or the wishes of others. They often act like "commands from above," or our conscience forces us to obey them. I can find no recognized name to mark this distinction; and to emphasize their peculiar sacrosanct character I propose to call them "transcendental," and the part of the individual mind to which they refer, "the transcendental field."

It is perhaps not too much to assume that the individual-psychological verification of this social-philosophical assumption could be found in C. F. Jung's theory of the "Collective Unconscious" containing the archetypal symbols derived from the intellectual heritage of the race.

The more "transcendental" elements are involved in a man's relationship to a particular group, the stronger the loyalties will be, and the more obedient will the individual be to the group, though

violent changes are also more likely to occur. Of what kind are the "transcendental" elements to which group and mass loyalties refer? Religion, Nationalism, political ideologies, are very important as each from a different angle they claim the whole individuality. Moral and ethical systems of thought are quite as important. Loyalties to Secret Societies take a distinguished place in the complex. Loyalties to societies like the Klu-Klux-Klan, the Cagoulards, the German Secret Nationalist Societies, or the Japanese Secret Military circles, not only indicate that many members are not conscious of their own national intellectual heritage (as C. J. Hayes puts it), but also that religion has only a superficial hold on the nation. Moreover, if the national and patriotic element is strongly projected into the "transcendental" field, it does usually demonstrate a lack of true unity within the nation, and serious clashes of loyalties, as in the case of the recently unified nations Germany and Italy.

For our enquiry it is important to realize that for the ordinary socially untrained people these sets of different values form an interwoven system. There is, as has been said, nevertheless a scale in the human mind in which these values figure. Although the rank which one particular element holds within the individual cannot often be easily discerned, by taking a whole group, or several groups constituting a substantial part of a community, it is possible to recognize a hierarchy of values, which is subject to a permanent process of change.

It appears now that this process of change is caused through a phenomenon which we shall call the "Conflict of Loyalties." Before we visualize this process of change in detail, let us refer back to our quotation of William James' "Faith Ladder," at the beginning of this paper. In a well-ordered community, life will seem harmonious and people generally will not easily be presented with issues demanding their decision in favour of this or that loyalty. Things will be very different in times of transition and insecurity. Here the individual is often faced by the challenge of divergent loyalties in his soul, loyalties which have become disintegrated from the intellectual heritage of the community. If he decides in favour of one particular set of loyalties, he will have to suppress the other sets all the more ruthlessly. If a man says: "It shall be true, at any rate true for me," we feel that this is an act of violent suppression of other loyalties which that man fears might challenge his predominant loyalty. If we have spoken of "transcendental loyalties," it was to indicate the type of loyalties which generally, under conditions of conflict, become predominant.

(4) For us, however, loyalties of the group are more interesting than individual loyalties. Whether the members of a group associate "transcendental" beliefs with their attachment to the group or not,

can (even under normal circumstances) be judged by examining the characteristic symbolism of that group. Symbols which personify nations, such as John Bull, the German Michel, Jean d'Arc, flags, emblems, names of Party leaders, even names of books, have often their place within the transcendental field. The presence of "transcendental" elements in group loyalties is a matter of degree; there is not always a clear-cut distinction possible, as minor transcendental elements may even be present in the attachment to voluntary associations (for instance, associations of a patriotic or charitable kind).

It is seldom easy to predict, however, what course the loyalties of the individual will take, so largely are they determined by private rational influences. On the other hand, even in comparatively static and secure times, the fundamental, economic, social, and technical trends of development, do not cease to function. The bigger numbers involved in associations and communities will facilitate an analysis of the impact of these trends of development on groups rather than on individuals. It is easier, therefore, to predict changes in the case of group loyalties than in the case of the loyalties of the individual. Our knowledge of the economic, social, political, and educational development, will help our forecast, For this reason it was, for example, reasonable to assume that the French working class would continue to oppose the Nazi system under the most difficult circumstances; on the other hand it seemed likely from the beginning that the Hungarian and Rumanian peasant classes would not show many signs of resistance.

Group mind is nothing else than the united pattern of psychological fragments of individuals; it is made up of those one-sided impulses, interests, and forces of the individuals, which are suitable for group integration (for detailed treatment of the matter see G. Simmel's *Soziologie*), and eventually become integrated in a particular group. It is important for us to realize that those parts of the individual which contribute to the group are more strongly influenced by historical, economic, social, and political development than those parts of his personality which remain "private." This pattern of social fragments also receives stronger impacts from religious and ideological sources than other parts of the individuality.

(5) There is a double relation between the transcendental field and the shaping of group loyalties:

(*a*) *On the one hand the form group loyalties take is considerably influenced by the hierarchy of values within the "transcendental" field.* By group loyalties two different things are to be understood:

(i) The loyalty of the individual to a group

(ii) The predominant loyalties within the group in their relation to the larger group of State or community

(*b*) *On the other hand the "transcendental" field of the individual mind is influenced and changed by both forms of group loyalties.* Both processes take place at the same time in a vacillating form.

As to (*a*) (i): If we imagine the relations between individuals constituting a Trade Union, or between members of a political party, we shall grasp that the loyalties of the individuals to the group are very variable and changeable relations. If a man changes his occupation, no strong inhibition will prevent him from changing his Trade Union at the same time. Under normal conditions if a man becomes discontented with the policy of his party, his inner conscience will not forbid him to change it. Very different is this relation where transcendental elements are concerned. It is generally no easy thing to change one's religion, it is not easy for members of authoritarian parties to leave their party, and this not only because of the material disadvantages involved. Those who wanted to leave the Roman Catholic Church in the 16th century stood under much the same sanctions as those who wanted to leave the Secret German Militarist Societies in the period 1918–1933, or those who wanted to leave the Communist Party between the two World Wars. The Irish Republican Army is another example. The sanctions generally applied were social ostracism, psychological and economic pressure against the dissident member, and only in extreme cases physical annihilation. Instances of the latter have mostly occurred in connection with Secret Societies for reasons which have been well stated by G. Simmel. (They have frequently been combating the State. The smaller circle competing with the larger circle has to adopt some of the elements of the first. On the other hand the smaller circle, which is the Secret Society, claims far-reaching liberties which are not compatible with the larger circle, the State. These liberties would easily end in anarchy. The "rituell" and the sanctions against heterodoxy, therefore, have to be stricter.)

All these examples are also a further illustration of the inseparable inter-connection of attachments which refer to those associations which are based in the "transcendental" field and which claim the whole individuality. All of them can figure very high in the human hierarchy of values, and their commands can cancel the results of rational considerations. If they claim the whole individuality of a person, they do so each from a different angle, but are nevertheless capable of disturbing the harmony in a community.

But even in normal times the group attachments of the individual are liable to be affected by changes in the scale of values. In accor-

dance with the notion of a free society elaborated above, an individual may choose to suspend his political activities and devote his time to the Salvation Army, if he has persuaded himself that his obligations as a Christian demand this of him. He may leave his political party if he thinks that it is merely an interest group and not working for the highest welfare of the nation, or he may join one of the other political parties if he thinks that the Government of the State is not fulfilling what the community expects it to fulfil. In normal times those who cherish their religion and nation as vital and intensely felt parts of their inner experience, will be more subject to changes in their relations to religious group and community than people with a firmly entrenched and static imagery. The latter continue quietly to live their private and family lives. They will go to church regularly, pay their taxes, etc., and their participation in politics in ordinary times will be relatively rare and stable. Their Prince, Emperor, or popular hero, sits in a beautiful palace in a distant shining capital which they seldom see, and looks after the well-being of the people. All this is greatly changed in unstable and insecure times.

The relation of the individuals to the group will be a very uncertain factor and subject to frequent changes for the further reason that it has to be filtered through so many individual deliberations, through the fluctuating temper of numerous local and district branches of the organization, the policy and personal ambitions of local functionaries, etc.

As to (*a*) (ii): The relation of the group to the larger associations which include it will tend under normal circumstances to be much stabler. In the relationship between group and individual, the levelling process, the sorting out of the pattern of social fragments, was still in progress. Now this process is complete, which means that the relation of the group to the community is no longer largely dependent on individual decisions based on private rational and psychological influences, but on the majority-opinion of those who take an active and regular part in group affairs, and whose vote is, therefore, not only counted but weighed. Those people, whether delegates, representatives, or functionaries, will now have a certain standardized attitude in regard to the relation of their group to State and community, which is more easily predictable. If in considering a certain question they are called upon to reflect on the relation of their group to the community, their standard will be based both on personal experience and on a respect for tradition which colours their whole mental attitude.

The higher the functionary within the group and the community, the weaker the force of symbols will become for him. (Authoritarian régimes do not form an exception to this rule.) This in normal times

will tend to make the relations between group and community stable and static. This makes it less difficult to foretell the practical results of the interplay of the various groups within a community. For it will, possibly, assume to a considerable extent, rational reasoning on the part of the group leaders.

Very different again will be the development in time of intensified social and national insecurity. Extensive social upheavals are liable to change fundamentally the function of whole groups and classes of a community; this is followed by deep changes in standards and loyalties. Such an upheaval will affect the elements of the transcendental field of large masses of those who do not experience religion and national sentiment as inner life, but who had been formerly integrated into the groups either by mere interest or by the inculcation of idealistic and stereotyped attitudes and beliefs. There is, moreover, in many communities a large body of people who have not yet been integrated into any pattern of mind, or who have been integrated only to a very small extent; the group loyalties of such people are weak and are frequently subject to change.

It has to be added now that in times of social upheaval considerable sections of those who had been previously integrated within groups acquire a state of mind which is very similar to those who had not been integrated at all, and assume their characteristic features.

Such a course of development will not even fail to influence the leaders and dignitaries of groups which were elements of stabilization in the preceding normal times. They will suddenly note that the masses which we previously characterized through their firmly entrenched and static imagery, have become accessible to new symbols which face the situation. This is well apt to make these leaders and group dignitaries anxious that their group should not lose all importance. They will, therefore, endeavour to adapt themselves to the new situation in order to preserve their group and their social position. Although their scale of values will be upset more slowly and sometimes not at all, they will be forced to acquiesce, and if an authoritarian régime should happen to be established, they will often pay formal reverence to it. This is the position of parts of the German and Italian Churches, and of some of the former German and Italian Labour leaders. It has been, and may be in future again, the attitude of churches, bureaucracies, the officer-corps and industrialists, whenever there is a revolution imminent.

The economic interest, as Marx and some of his antagonists have elaborated, will play a large part, though it cannot truthfully be said that it is exclusively responsible for such developments.

(*b*) On the other hand the "transcendental" field of the individual is influenced by both forms of group loyalties (the loyalty of the

individual to the group, and the predominant loyalties within the group in their relation to the larger group or the community).

During apparently static stages of social development, in times of security, the "transcendental field" is relatively unperturbed, as the process takes place gradually and as a rule unperceived. Community life will appear harmonious.

During times of sudden change and insecurity, a radical change in the hierarchy of values often takes place. The masses visualize a torrent of changes in the social and economic structure which affects their lives profoundly, but which they cannot explain themselves. The old harmony is gone, and so is the synchronization of human loyalties. At the same time the lines of communication between individual and Central Authority are shortened. For the groups which in normal conditions act as mediators between individuals and community, are weakened first through authoritarian propaganda, and later either completely suppressed or entirely changed. Through the elimination of these intermediate groups and with the help of symbols which appeal to the social heritage of the masses, a direct relation is established between individual and the State. Far too little attention has been paid to the real nature of the so-called "scapegoats." Let us think only of the three main "scapegoats" used by Nazism: the "Jews," the "Freemasons," and the "Roman Catholic Church." The scapegoat "Freemasons" was first applied in Roman Catholic Bavaria and in Austria, where the people remembered the conflict between the Roman Church and Freemasonry. The "scapegoat" "Roman Catholic Church," on the other hand, was applied in Protestant Prussia. It is important to realize that once people have accepted one scapegoat which is in some way related to their social heritage, they are inclined to accept further scapegoats, however opposed these may be to their social heritage. (It was not uncommon round about 1936 to hear in Bavaria or Austria about "the sinister plots of the Roman Catholic Church," etc.). In this way an artificial unity of thought is created.

Moreover, by the destruction or strict control of intermediate groups such as other political parties, churches, Trade Unions, bodies which could attract competing loyalties are eliminated. On the other hand, the human need of attachment to intermediate groups is saturated by the artificial re-arousing of old conflicts of loyalties (when, for instance, the Catalans were reminded of their former connection with France, etc.).

(6) If the question is frequently asked how it is possible that there is no serious sign of collective resistance in Germany in which the Nazi Party was a minority right up to the last elections of 1933; when it is asked why do not the Germans revolt, having ample opportunity for it in the Russian front line; the answer is that the

unified pattern in Germany has been achieved through a skilful handling of the elements of the hierarchy of human values, including those constituting the "transcendental" pattern. Lack of space prevents us from describing here the methods of group integration practised by modern tyranny.

But it can be indicated that Authoritarianism in general, and Nazism in particular, seems to have made full use of the facts mentioned above. Nazism was skilful in creating in all European countries artificial conflicts of loyalties, and in stressing those which existed in the present and the past. The main problem of the modern tyrant is to find a way of integrating into a plan of action all the existing stereotyped ways of thought which the population may have inherited through a long historic, economic, religious, social, and national development.

The authoritarians soon recognized that if they wanted to obtain complete control of the various groups of a community, they must begin by splitting the loyalties within these groups. This process depends very much on the means by which the substance to which loyalties are attached is annihilated, and some substitute symbol put forward instead. If the shell is left intact, this does not disturb too much the stereotyped ways of thought. (Authoritarianism applied here only techniques which go as far back as Emperor Augustus.)

The first step towards the destruction of the unified pattern of authoritarian thought must be the attempt to bring about an organized disintegration of the foundations of mass loyalties towards Nazism.

One of the main reasons for the lack of success which meets the Allied revolt appeal to the German people, seems to be the fact that we have made no attempt to diagnose the origins of enforced unification and levelling under Nazi rule.

It may of course be that our own ethical and international standards which we inherited from the 19th century prevent us from launching that ruthless attack on the pseudo-loyalties towards the Axis Governments, which alone is capable in the age of mass democracy and modern communication of destroying the world of falsehood and terror which modern tyrants have built. If the enforced imagery, the Charismatic features of Nazism, and its system of scapegoats are attacked, the foundation of artificial unity with its formula: "It shall be true, at any rate true for me," will be annihilated.

NEW BOOKS

Berkeley's Argument about Material Substance. Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, British Academy. By C. D. Broad, Fellow of the Academy; read March 25th, 1942. (From the *Proceedings of the British Academy,* Vol. XXVIII. Humphrey Milford, London. Pp. 22. Price 1s. 6d.)

Professor Broad's aim in this admirable lecture is twofold; first, to give Berkeley the fairest possible run for his money by stating his theory in unambiguous language; secondly, to estimate its merits and defects by comparing it both with the Naive Realism of the vulgar and with the so-called Representationist Theory of Descartes and Locke, which has been inherited (with minor modifications) by modern science.

In any exposition of Berkeley the chief thing we have to do is to avoid the confusions into which he himself was led by his use of the question-begging word "idea." Professor Broad states Berkeley's main contentions as follows. Let us use the word "sensibile" to mean "any particular which has a sensible quality." Then Berkeley holds (1) that the phrase "material thing" just means a group of sensibilia, (2) that it is meaningless to speak of unsensed sensibilia, (3) that to perceive a material thing is just to sense a selection from that group of interconnected sensibilia which constitute the material thing in question. But it is clearly true that in some sense a material object can exist when no one perceives it. What is to be done about this? Berkeley's "first move," Professor Broad points out, is to reduce statements about such unperceived objects from the categorical to the conditional form, i.e. to adopt what would now be called a Phenomenalistic analysis of such statements. When I say that the tree exists in the Quad though no one perceives it, I mean that *if* certain conditions—themselves describable in terms of sensation—were to be fulfilled, then someone *would* have such and such visual or tactual sensations (cf. e.g. *Principles of Human Knowledge,* sections 58 and 59). But Berkeley, like others since, is apparently uncomfortable about this reduction of a categorical statement to a conditional one. Accordingly he suggests instead that when no man or animal is perceiving the tree, it is still being perceived by God. He then completes his theory by maintaining (4) that our sensations, when we do have them, are telepathically produced by God.

With regard to God's perceptions, I think that Prof. Broad somewhat misrepresents Berkeley's view. He makes Berkeley hold that God, when he perceives the tree, is *having sensations*—sensations more or less like the ones which we should have had if we had been in the Quad at the time (p. 5). Now Berkeley's language is often careless, but in the *Third Dialogue* he explicitly repudiates this suggestion. Thus he says "God . . . who perceives nothing by sense as we do . . . it is evident such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected by any painful sensation *or indeed any sensation at all*"; and again "God knows or hath ideas; but his ideas are *not conveyed to him by sense,* as ours are" (Everyman Edition, p. 278—my italics).

But of course, if God "perceives nothing by sense as we do" it is not at all clear what Berkeley is intending to say; for a non-sensuous perception would seem not to be perception at all. Nor is it at all clear what kind of being the tree is supposed to have "when there's no one about in the Quad," or

indeed, what kind of being the back or insides of the tree would have when we are perceiving the front of it. Then ought Berkeley to have stuck to his first or Phenomenalistic view? But if so, his claim to be defending the views of common sense (a claim which Professor Broad does not sufficiently stress) would seem to fall to the ground. For, as Professor Broad maintains later, the plain man does believe—however mistakenly—that the unseen back of the object has colour and shape in the same literal and categorical sense as the seen front has; and he believes likewise that the tree is literally and categorically coloured and shaped when no man or animal is perceiving it at all.

It might, however, be suggested that this disagreement between the plain man and the Phenomenalistic philosopher is perhaps not so acute as it seems. Philosophical critics are perhaps inclined to suppose that the plain man's beliefs are more clear and definite than they really are. Moreover, perceptual belief is belief of a very peculiar kind. It is below the level of words. But if so, is there any meaning in asking whether the thing believed is categorical or hypothetical? No doubt all belief requires symbolism of some sort. But if the symbols are merely images and kinaesthetic sensations, the kind of syntactical distinctions which apply to verbally formulated beliefs—for example, this distinction between categorical and hypothetical—would seem to have no application. I do not mean, of course, that the plain man's perceptual beliefs are vague in all respects. The *qualities* which he attributes to the unseen back of the tree (or to the totally unperceived tree) are definite enough. It is green, not red; round and bulgy, rather than flat and square. The vagueness I refer to concerns not the constituents of his belief, but rather the syntactical structure of it.

Next, I should like to draw attention to Professor Broad's very interesting discussion of Berkeley's views concerning the "minute structure" of Nature (pp. 7–8). His example is this. A typhoid epidemic breaks out. A bacteriologist, by means of a microscope, discovers typhoid germs in the milk supply. Those germs are supposed to have caused the epidemic. Moreover, the bacteriologist predicts that they will cause typhoid symptoms in other people who may drink the milk hereafter. Now Berkeley holds, according to Professor Broad, that those germs did not exist before the bacteriologist saw them, and ceased to exist when he ceases to see them. How then, can they be held to cause the disease? Berkeley's solution is "to distinguish empirical regularities and genuine causal transactions." The real cause of the typhoid is God's volitions. "The minute mechanisms, which we seem to *discover* with the microscope and which we wrongly regard as the *causes* of phenomena, are simply more minute and subtle signs from which we can infer God's volitions" (p. 8).

I think that this *is* Berkeley's solution and that Professor Broad has stated it admirably. But there are two further remarks to be made. First, there is a sense, according to Berkeley, in which the typhoid germs do exist before and after they are seen through the microscope, just as the tree exists when no man or animal perceives it: either in the sense that they are actually perceived by God, or in the sense that it is always *possible* for us to perceive them, *if* we take the trouble to put ourselves in suitable conditions. (This, of course, is quite compatible with the distinction between signs and causes. Even though the germs do in a sense exist when not perceived by us, we could still maintain that they do not cause the typhoid, but are merely signs by which we are able to predict it when and if we perceive them.) Secondly, the minute structure of Nature, as we commonly conceive of it, does not consist only of entities observable by means of microscopes. It also contains such entities as electrons and light-waves, which are not observable in any way at all. Obviously this is a much greater difficulty for Berkeley. Professor

Broad mentions it (at the top of p. 8), but unfortunately he does not discuss it; and Berkeley himself seems to ignore it altogether. I think the only expedient open to Berkeley at this point is to maintain—as perhaps some modern Physicists would—that these totally imperceptible entities are not genuine entities at all, but rather "logical constructions" out of entities which *can* be perceived. Thus when we say that light rays travel approximately in straight lines, we should mean that the various places from which a flash is visible can be plotted upon approximately straight lines all radiating from a certain small volume. When we say that light rays are reflected by mirrors, we should be describing how the visible position of a mirror-image differs from the visible position of the correlated "normal" sensibilia. Whether this solution is applicable to such "microphysical" entities as atoms and electrons is not so clear. Presumably Berkeley would have to say that sentences in which they are mentioned are ways of talking about what happens to photographic plates and other perceptible objects in certain perceptible conditions. Whatever difficulties of detail there may be about this solution, it is presumably open to him to maintain that since Physics is an *empirical* science, its statements about totally imperceptible entities must somehow or other be translatable into statements (no doubt much more complicated ones) about perceptible entities.

I have not space to deal fully with the critical, as distinct from the expository, part of Professor Broad's lecture. I will confine myself to his criticism of Berkeley's *esse est percipi* doctrine. Is Berkeley right in maintaining that the phrase "unsensed sensibilia" is meaningless? In the case of toothaches, tastes, smells, and possibly sounds his view seems at first sight plausible; but it seems very much less plausible for visual and tactual sensibilia. There are, in fact, two possible analyses of sensation. Professor Broad does not give them names; I shall call them "the Adverbial Analysis" and "the Act-Object Analysis" respectively. According to the Adverbial Analysis, having a toothache consists in feeling achily, and seeing a red round colour-expanse consists in seeing redly and roundly. According to the Act-Object Analysis, having toothache consists in being acquainted with a toothachy sensibile, and the visual experience consists in being acquainted with a red and round sensibile. According to the Adverbial Analysis, which is the one adopted by Berkeley, it is meaningless to suggest that there could be either unfelt aches or unseen colour-expanses; according to the Act-Object Analysis, the suggestion has a perfectly good meaning, though there may be empirical grounds for thinking that it is in fact false. (On the Adverbial Analysis, of course, it would not *even* be false.)

Which if these two analyses are we to accept? The question is very puzzling. For, as Professor Broad points out, we find that the various types of sensation can be arranged in a scale, running from organic sensation at the bottom to visual sensation at the top, with sensations of smell and sound somewhere in between. For the lower part of the scale the Adverbial Analysis seems obviously correct, and for the upper part the Act-Object Analysis seems no less obviously correct; while sensations of smell and sound form a debatable territory in the middle. Now it has usually been assumed by philosophers that one or other of these analyses *ought* to apply throughout the whole scale. Accordingly, some fall into the paradox of saying that we see redly, roundly, and bulgily; while others are driven to maintain that it makes sense to speak of unfelt toothaches, even though they admit on empirical grounds that in fact only felt toothaches exist. But Professor Broad suggests that perhaps the initial assumption of both parties is mistaken. The one word "sensation" may cover experiences of several different types—experiences which differ

not merely in respect of the qualities sensed (as aches differ from colours) but also in respect of their epistemological structure. All the experiences described as sensations do indeed resemble each other in two important ways: (1) positively, in respect of their causation, (2) negatively, in that they are all "non-discursive" experiences (as contrasted with such experience as conceiving or inferring). But though they resemble each other thus far, there may still be differences of structure between them; and the Adverbial Analysis may be correct for some of them, e.g. for toothaches, while the Act-Object Analysis is correct for others, e.g. visual experiences.

This is a very ingenious solution of the difficulty, but it leaves several "loose ends," as I believe Professor Broad would admit. First, what is to be done about the middle part of the scale—sensations of smell, hearing, and touch? We can hardly say that in their case both analyses are equally correct, for the two analyses are mutually inconsistent. For my part, I confess that it does seem to me to make sense to speak of unheard sounds and unsmelt smells, even though there may be good empirical grounds for believing that in fact there are none. The statement that a chair in my room creaked at 3 p.m. to-day, when there was no one in the room to hear it, seems to me to be at least false, not meaningless. But, curiously enough, I feel less confident about touch. For it seems impossible to separate touch from organic sensation (it might even be treated as a *kind* of organic sensation) and, if so, the Adverbial Analysis would seem to apply to it.

Secondly, how do the different types of sensations come to form a "scale" at all? What is the difference between organic sensation and visual sensation which makes it natural to apply the Adverbial Analysis to the one and the Act-Object Analysis to the other, while we remain undecided about smells and sounds? I would suggest that two considerations are relevant here. First, the ordinary man does not distinguish between himself and his body; he applies the word "I" indifferently to both. Hence aches and pains seem to him to fall on the subject-side of the subject-object distinction; they are "how I feel" rather than "what I am aware of." But it is possible, though difficult, to regard one's own body as just one material object among others. It then becomes natural to say not "I feel achily" but rather "I am aware of an ache located in such-and-such a place," i.e. to apply the Act-Object Analysis even to organic sensation; and it then becomes intelligible (even though false) to suggest that the ache might still be there even if I were unaware of it. Again, the various sensations in Professor Broad's scale differ in respect of what Physiologists call "projection"—what Berkeley called "outness." Colours and sounds present themselves as something "out there"; toothaches never do, while smells, tactual pressures, and felt heat and cold sometimes do and sometimes do not. Thus the different stages in Professor Broad's scale seem to correspond to what we might call "degrees of projectibility." We may notice also that the projectedness of sounds is less complete than that of colours. Sounds do not have a place in the sense in which colours do. A sound is rather "from a direction" than "in a place." The same thing applies to smells and thermal sensations in so far as they are projected at all.

There are many other points in Professor Broad's lecture which deserves discussion, but I have not space enough to deal with them. All students of Berkeley—which is as much as to say, all students of the Theory of Knowledge —should read it for themselves.

H. H. Price.

Science and Ethics. By C. H. WADDINGTON, D.Sc., and eighteen others. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1942. Pp. 144. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This seems to me to be an exceptionally interesting little book although I think very little of Dr. Waddington's evolutionary solution, nominally the centre of the discussion. But I am sure that Dr. Waddington is heartily to be congratulated for arousing, continuing, and publishing the discussion, and more particularly for the liveliness and good humour he invariably shows.

It began in *Nature*, to which journal Dr. Waddington contributed a short essay on "Science and Ethics." By invitation, certain prominent people sent their comments to the journal, and Dr. Waddington's private correspondence on the subject went on growing after the columns of *Nature* were closed to it. Here we have the whole discussion.

Had the debate been wholly about evolutionary ethics it might well have fallen rather flat. Dr. Waddington, however, gave it a lively initial impetus by saying that he was proposing to offer a scientific answer to the sort of attack that "popular intellectuals" are (or were recently) accustomed to make upon ethics. There were four columns in this attack, viz., psycho-analysis, anthropology, Marxism, and logical positivism (Dr. Waddington wants to show precisely why he is not a fifth columnist). In the subsequent debate the logical positivists get very little rope, the anthropologists not much in detail, and the Marxists not a great deal (though of course Dr. J. B. S. Haldane is allowed to say that evolution is "dialectical"). The psycho-analysts are treated much more generously. As I have said, however, the bulk of the discussion is about evolutionary ethics.

This subject was discussed very carefully in England and elsewhere before and about the turn of the century with special attention to its analytical implications. I cannot see that Dr. Waddington has introduced a single new analytical idea or that his analytical powers in ethical matters are at all comparable to his analytical powers in biological matters. He seems content with the view that the "general direction" of evolution is what we must mean by good or right if we are "realists." For such statements De Burgh, Ritchie, and the Dean of St. Paul's very properly tick him off. So do Bernal and J. S. Huxley, though not quite in the same way (but Huxley is plainly making the same criticism as the others when he says that Waddington's general conception "smacks of Panglossic optimism" and when he goes on to say that "evolution" need not be *progressive* change and that evolutionary *progress* is "a rare phenomenon"). When such things are said Dr. Waddington appears not to know what is happening to him, not even when he is shaken up by Dr. Dingle (who made the point rather savagely) and has a twenty-page discussion about it in which several hares are started and a good many rabbits.

It is rather difficult in fact to be favourably impressed by Dr. Waddington's consistency. On page 107 he says, "It cannot be in itself good to murder a large number of Germans"—which is good old-fashioned intuitionism. On page 136 he says that if a "general evolutionary regression" took place "there would be no way of determining a generally valid ethical system applicable under the circumstances." This statement plainly implies that Dr. Waddington *can* distinguish between progress and retrogression in a way not derived from "general evolution" (which, *ex hypothesi*, may be either). It also seems to imply that "general evolution" is, so far, good, and general retrogression bad so that the two cancel out. This seems to me to approach nonsense asymptotically but very rapidly.

The best part of the book, I think, is the discussion with Dr. K. Stephen. Dr. Stephen is anxious to correct certain misapprehensions about psychoanalysis, including some of Dr. Waddington's, and also to show that psychoanalysis is much more scientific than its romantic jargon suggests to the uninitiated. This she does very skilfully, in a philosophical as well as in a scientific way. When she has to say what has to be said she says it. "Is there *any* reason," she asks (p. 69) "to suppose that evolution as a whole has the production of our "good" mature personalities as its goal?" But she is an adept (and not by chance) at avoiding thin analytical ice and gives her mind to the attempt to discover what she and Waddington can agree in commending. In short, her letters are beautiful examples of philosophical adaptability, and intensely interesting as examples of the technique of agreement despite radical divergence upon "ultimate" questions. I wish I had Dr. Stephen's skill. Lacking it, and having no desire in the world to agree with about half of these authors, I have reluctantly joined the tickers-off. I should like to repeat, however, that I think the discussion profoundly interesting, and am most grateful to Dr. Waddington in particular both for what he gives and for what he gives away.

JOHN LAIRD.

George Dawes Hicks. By W. G. DE BURGH. (From the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. XXVII. London: Humphrey Milford. 1942. Pp. 29. 3s. net.)

Professor de Burgh's appreciation, with its judicious selection from other recent tributes, puts on record a fitting memorial of the interesting personality of George Dawes Hicks. Touching lightly upon Hicks's limitations, de Burgh has produced a faithful portrait. More might perhaps have been said of Hicks's painstaking interest in his students, his generous hospitality, his almost child-like humour, and his immense appreciation of a friendly call in his years of loneliness. Most people knew him as a doughty warrior in the field of ideas; some of us were privileged to enter the shrine of his exquisitely tender sympathies.

De Burgh rightly observes that Hicks's concentration on problems of epistemology was not prejudicial to his interest in other branches of philosophy; yet from first to last, the theory of knowledge was his main interest and the key to the unlocking of all other doors. One might say that Hicks staked his entire theory of knowledge on the discrimination of (*a*) thing, (*b*) content apprehended, and (*c*) content of the act of apprehension. An existent thing, he argued, is an entity which has being or is or will be at or in a particular place or at a particular time, or, as in the case of mental entities, only at a particular time. The ways in which existent reality is apprehended (contents apprehended) are not themselves existents. To some extent this is but a re-statement of the Aristotelian doctrine that sense-perception is a power of apprehending the forms or essences of sensible objects without their matter, i.e. he did not conceive the content perceived to be an existing reality, because to constitute an existing entity both matter and form were necessary. Aristotle, it is true, maintained that the sentient soul was passively affected, but such passive affection was, in his view, only one side of the whole process, which, besides being in its most important aspect the actualization of what the sensuous soul is potentially, was also an act of discrimination. The external object is in no way altered or affected by the fact of its being apprehended, but in and through the apprehending act there is awareness of certain of its features which constitute that group

as the content apprehended—an appearance as contrasted with the real existent thing. The apprehending act exists; the external object exists; but Hicks saw no ground for regarding the appearance as a third existing entity. On the contrary, appearances as distinct from things of which they are appearances do not occupy any part of the common space in which physical objects exist. They do not set other things in motion, nor are they set in motion by other things. Hicks used the term "subsist" to denote the mode of being of appearances. They have no characteristics; the thing alone has characteristics. The appearances have the same mode of being as the timeless universals.

With regard to the content of the act of apprehending, Professor de Burgh gently criticizes the use of the term "content" in this connexion. Hicks steadily maintained, however, that *Inhalt* was a legitimate term to denote the nature of a thing, i.e. its properties or qualities. The perceiving mind, like the perceived thing, has its content, which no doubt is exceedingly complex. The outstanding characteristic of all acts of perception is that of discriminating; but each act has its own unique and distinctive characteristics. When the act of discriminating is directed upon a flower, the conscious subject becomes aware of its colour, shape, and various botanical parts; i.e. of the appearance of the flower. The *awareness* of the appearance of the flower is the content (or at least part of the content) of the perceiving act, and as such it is by no means identical with the appearance of the flower, any more than the awareness of colour is itself coloured.

I suggest that Hicks uses the term content quite consistently to denote the nature or characteristics of something. The content of the perceived thing is the sum total of its characteristics or qualities; the content perceived is so many of those characteristics as we are actually aware of; and the content of the act of apprehending is likewise its nature or characteristic of awareness of the features of the thing. It is this distinction that colours all Hicks's thought, and by its implications for epistemology his contribution to thought will be appraised.

F. E. England.

Philosophical Foundations of Faith. By Marion John Bradshaw. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. x + 254. Price 16s. 6d.)

The title and sub-title of this book ("a Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion") are both, I think, misleading. What the author has attempted, and with some measure of success, is to present anew half a dozen of the greatest figures of the philosophical thought of the seventeenth century so as to bring out the important place which the Christian religion occupied in their lives and in their thinking. He is, I think, undoubtedly right in contending that standard histories of philosophy with their main interest centred in the epistemological problem have devoted less attention than they should to the religious convictions of the philosophers with whom they have had to deal. Historians of philosophy have not always been noted for piety; and it is an easy step from relegating a discussion of X's religious beliefs and their significance for subsequent thought to a subordinate place in the account given of X to assuming that the religious interest and motive were from X's own point of view equally subordinate. The author writes: "Although we begin our study without revisionist prepossessions, it will cause the author no regret it it makes some great philosophers seem more religious than students of the history of Philosophy have commonly supposed them to be." I think he has succeeded in doing this.

The six thinkers he is concerned with are Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Pascal, Spinoza, and Leibniz. About each of them he has something interesting to say. And yet one is left with the impression that in the course of the exposition the meaning of Christianity has been interpreted in such a syncretistic and latitudinarian sense that some at least of the eminent men here studied would have been seriously distressed at the impartial and equal approbation which the author appears to extend to the "Christianity" of all the six. (One is reminded of the Irishman on the refractory horse, one of whose hind feet somehow got caught in a loose stirrup: "Sure, and if you're for getting on, I'm for getting off!") Is not an interpretation of piety so inclusive as to bring together Pascal and Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza in equal commendation bound to be somewhat diluted?

The author succeeds best, I think, with Descartes and Leibniz. Many, and not only Protestants, have been led unjustifiably to discredit the former's religioius sincerity and Catholic conviction. It is not easy to see how Descartes thought he could reconcile his teachings with such a doctrine as Transsubstantiation, but he did think so. Mr. Bradshaw adopts in the main the views of Gouhier on this matter (in *La Pensee Religieuse de Descartes*). (There is one baffling remark, in which we are told that "the idea of an inch is probably (sic) as long as the idea of a mile." How are ideas measured?) As regards Leibniz, the temptation has been to attribute to him not covert hypocrisy so much as dilettantism concerning religion, to regard it as having been one of his hobbies. The author cites effectively from French (Baruzzi) and German (Merkel) writers on Leibniz to bring out how central and persistent his devotion to Christianity was, and not least his interest in Christian missions (especially to China). We are also reminded that he thought Europe had much to learn from China, and there is all too much aptness to-day in one of the author's quotations from a comment of Leibniz: "In view of the vast collapse of ethics in Europe, it appears almost necessary for the Chinese to send missionaries to *us*, who might instruct us in the exercise of natural theology."

In a final chapter Mr. Bradshaw puts forward very modestly his own conclusions from his survey. Through all the diversities of system elements of common faith can be detected. While as already suggested one may feel that he has been over-hospitable in treating as complementary what are in fact incompatible religious interpretations, it is only fair to give in conclusion his own comment upon the matter, with the spirit of which indeed I have to wish to quarrel: "It is clear, indeed, that only a religion whose rich diversity exceeded the intellectual grasp of any one mind could have made simultaneous appeal to thinkers as far apart as were those six great founders who remade philosophy three centuries ago."

J. W. Harvey.

Freedom. Its Meaning. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. (George Allen & Unwin. 1942. Pp. 335. Price 16s.)

The series which this book inaugurates is designed to assist in "the reinterpretation of the fundamental values of mankind." Each volume, a co-operative effort by distinguished authorities, will seek to synthesize contemporary ideas. on one single well-defined subject. The method leads inevitably to repetition and lack of co-ordination, but in the present volume far more of the essays are valuable than it is possible to mention in a short review.

Both Croce and Dewey emphasize the fact that to-day free institutions are not so much overthrown as abandoned willingly. Why has this happened?

Surely the book ought to have included a statement by a thorough-going Devil's advocate, arguing that freedom, far from being the ideal condition for men, is a snare. In fact there should have been a contribution by Hitler. The Fascist and Nazi contempt for freedom is an element in the widespread revulsion against a sick civilization and all its values. Not Christian love but pagan might, not rationality but thinking with the blood, not individuality but self-immolation in the herd, not freedom but absolute obedience are the new values. We who believe in freedom have not merely to affirm our faith but also to understand and learn from that revolt. Somehow we must integrate the need for freedom with the complementary and equally important need for devotion and obedience.

Even those contributors who emphasize the inevitability of restrictions on freedom in a complex society fail to give full weight to the fact that freedom alone is not enough. J. B. S. Haldane, who rightly argues that in a capitalist society freedom is often merely freedom for the powerful to exploit the weak, does not mention the insufficiency of mere freedom as an ideal. Bertrand Russell rightly says that, while scientific technique has increased "physical" freedom, it has necessitated new restrictions on "social" freedom, for instance in traffic-regulations; but he too is silent on the *need* for loyalty. For him the cause of lack of freedom is simply the "impulse to tyranny." Even a democratic society, he says, may destroy freedom when this impulse dominates the majority. True, but he does not recognize that freedom may cease to be an inspiring ideal even to those who are not in a position to tyrannize. Russell and other contributors emphasize the fact that only in a secure and harmonious society can freedom flourish. Danger inevitably involves discipline. In the words of Haldane, "only a classless society which does not feel itself menaced either from within or from without is likely to develop a true political freedom." Yes, but once more what of the will not to be free but to be used?

MacMurray goes nearer to the root of the matter. While he is surely mistaken in attributing the loss of freedom *always* to personal factors, he is abundantly right in affirming that, for freedom to flourish, there must be a strong sense of community, a positive "impulse to share a common life," an earnest will that persons shall always be treated with respect for their personality. Though economic and political institutions often violate freedom, they alone cannot guarantee it. Nothing can guarantee it but the will for "the primacy of the personal nexus of community over the functional nexus of organized society." With this view Jacques Maritain agrees when he says, "The soul of social life is fashioned by that which abounds in it from the true internal life of individual persons. . . . Good will and a relation of respect and love between persons alone can give to the *movement* of the social body a truly human character."

Excellent! But the Devil's advocate may still complain that, since mere freedom cannot satisfy the need to lose oneself in something more admirable than oneself, freedom is not a desirable end. What is the answer? Hogben is indeed right in insisting that "the challenge of Fascism must be answered by a positive creed." But what creed?

For Maritain the creed is Roman Catholicism; and, if I understand him, it is based on the spontaneous service of a being who demands that his human creatures shall be as "spiritual" as possible. And this means, I take it, as fully persons as possible. Here, in spite of the fact that so much of Maritain's position is alien to the temper of contemporary thought, we have a hint of the true answer to the Devil's advocate. Freedom is a necessary part of the ideal because freedom, as well as self-abnegation, is necessary to fulness of

personality, because the giving of the self to something greater than the self must be always a free act. Moreover it must be a giving not merely to the state or the race, both of which are merely derivative from the selves that compose them, but to something really worthy of the self's utmost devotion, because greater than the self in its own kind, because more spiritual. For Maritain this something must necessarily be a personal or superpersonal God. Unfortunately the faith in such a being, still more the acceptance of the detailed doctrine of the Roman Church, is unacceptable to many of those who nevertheless feel an awakening loyalty to *something* spiritual, about which they can give no clear account. Is it sufficient to say that this something which baffles all description is *at least* both the source and the goal of the self's longing to fulfil its potentiality, and that this end is to be fulfilled only in the free giving of the self in service of true community, or more precisely in service of the potentiality of the human species for personality-in-community?

OLAF STAPLEDON.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XVI: "The Problem of Liberty." (Catholic University of America: Washington, D.C. Pp. 293. Price $1.50.)

If the Dark Ages descend once more upon Europe, as seems not unlikely, we may still be grateful to America for being more than the "arsenal of Democracy." The discussion of the idea of liberty, which forms the theme of the latest volume of the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association provides, in accessible form, much material which ought to be available for those who are concerned to rescue man from the tyranny under which he seems in some danger of coming. The majority of the papers are, as usual, based directly upon the writings of the great Scholastics, and may make forbidding reading for those less accustomed to the style and method of the Schoolmen, but those who are not put off by such obstacles will find the time devoted, say, to the first paper, dealing with the historical development of St. Thomas's ideas on human freedom, time well spent. A more modern discussion is provided by Fr. McAllister's necessarily sketchy but none the less interesting account of the lineal connection between Adolf Hitler's ideas and those of Fichte and, through him, with Kant's categorical imperative.

If the whole volume seems somehow remote and academic, that is perhaps more the fault of our times than of those who produced it. There can be no sort of doubt of the urgency of the problems discussed and of the soundness of the principles from which they are discussed. Thought must remain the privilege and the responsibility of the few: and perhaps we are as far as ever from the day of the philosopher-king. But only by somehow relating these "academic" studies to real life can there be hope for civilization.

THOMAS CORBISHLEY.

Sweden Speaks. Edited by GUSTAF WITTING. Translated by EDITH M. NIELSEN. (George Allen & Unwin. Pp. 212. Price 3s. 6d.)

All our countrymen who visit Sweden come back charmed with the country and its inhabitants. We feel at once that we are among our own kinsfolk; though the Swedes are physically a finer race than the British, and certainly not less civilized. All eugenists and many others regret that the Swedish birth-rate is the lowest in Europe.

This book is a very generous appreciation of our contributions to European civilization. Experts have written on our political and social institutions, on education, sport, literature, the theatre, art, science, medicine, and religion. So far as I am qualified to judge, all these subjects are admirably treated. Readers of *Philosophy* will miss a chapter on British philosophy. But it is well known that, in spite of Rudolf Metz's excellent book, also published in English by Messrs. George Allen & Unwin, our philosophy is neglected on the Continent. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* has at last been translated into German, but Bosanquet and Pringle Pattison are almost unknown, and Bertrand Russell is the only familiar name to continental readers.

There are two reasons why the Swedish nation feels an increased interest and sympathy with England, as compared with 1914, when the educated class had come a good deal under German influence. The first is that the second world war is plainly not merely a struggle for supremacy in Europe, but a life-and-death conflict between two ideologies, two divergent conceptions of the way life should be lived, and of ultimate values. The "English way of life" is too firmly rooted in all countries where our language is spoken, and too precious in itself, to be destroyed even by defeat in war; but it might be depressed and partially discredited; and this, our essayists are agreed, would be a very grievous blow to human progress and human happiness.

The second reason is that the downfall of the British Commonwealth would seal the fate of all the smaller nations of Europe. All would lose their independence. The Germans try to persuade themselves and others that nationalism (except in Germany!) is an anachronism and a spent force. The minor nations will be content with local self-government, and, of course, with a lower standard of living than the *Herrenvolk*. There are no signs of this anywhere. On the contrary, the passion for independence among small nations is far stronger than it was when Napoleon awoke the dormant spirit of patriotism in one people after another, and it has not been diminished by German methods of frightfulness in the occupied lands. There is no enthusiasm anywhere for the New Order; the force behind Fascism is fear—fear of Germany and fear of Communism. The fall of British thalassocracy would not herald "a thousand years of peace," but an orgy of internecine war. When the oak falls, says a Greek proverb, every man gathers faggots. The intelligent Swedes now understand all this well enough.

This book is commendably free from the racialist myth. Our institutions are what our history has made them, and it cannot be said that the course of events has proved that they have led us into a blind alley. Liberalism and liberty are now under a cloud, but they are certainly not dead. Our great contribution to civilized ethics is, as the writers insist, the ideal of the gentleman. Now that this ideal has been purged of its adventitious connection with heraldry and property in land, it stands as one of the finest lay religions in the world, and is recognized as such. Snobbery still exists, standing on its head, among the class-conscious Babus who think it funny to sneer at "the old school tie"; but, as one of the writers in this book says, if you tell a British workman that he is no gentleman he will let you know all that that insult implies. For the rest, we have our faults, to some of which our Swedish friends may seem a little blind; but we are not now in an arrogant mood, and this appreciation may confirm us in our conviction that we are fighting to preserve something extremely worth preserving, and that if we survive this terrible attack upon all that makes life worth living for us the world will not be slow to feel and express its gratitude. W. R. Inge.

War in the Mind: The Case Book of a Medical Psychologist. By CHARLES BERG. (London: The Macaulay Press. 1941. Pp. 272. Price 8s. 6d.)

War in the mind is a conflict between two different forms of reality, between a child's world of "as if" and the tested and reasonable adult world of "as such." Anxiety is always a causal agency and the less this can safely be related to the objective world the more it is experienced as physical and irrational danger; the more associations it has with definite objects the more it is related to the social world and with potentially reasonable causes. Ultimate epistemological analysis leads to sensations that are not further analysable by introspection; depth psychological analysis leads to sensations, feelings, and strivings or actions. Thought is primarily a biological function serving life itself, and its eventual aim is to be translated into action.

The main difficulty of the child's reality is that it is dealing with qualities and attributes of objects before these have attained a 3-dimensional solidity, and before it has any clearly defined categories so necessary for the perception of a causal nexus. In fact at one stage sensations appear to arrive before their causal agencies are understood. Consequently, the child has to invent "things," as transitional vehicles, to carry its dynamic impulses and complex sensations toward the objective world to which it is inexorably impelled; and this it does by means of its imaginative faculty, *in lieu* of ideas. Modern slang is instructive in this respect: "I've got a *thing* about that!" Moreover, since the child's vocabulary is one concerned originally with its body, organs, and functions it is not surprising when the upbringers early force it to regard these vehicles as indecent, and even obscene, that its "things" become repressed and erupt with episodic anxiety in adult life.

Da Vinci remarked that "It is easy to be universal"—this may be true of a Leonardo. But Dostoevsky better understood the cosmic depths of human nature when he put into the mouth of Mitya Karamazov the words, "What is beauty to the heart is obscenity to the mind." And Pascal hurled back the emotional challenge when he cried out, "The heart has its reasons that the head recks nothing of."

Freud's great patience and scientific mind explored and perfected a reliable instrument for the synthesis of these two apparently contradictory worlds of reality. The Transference phenomenon is the establishment of relationships with the physician to act as a bridge of contact—always put across by the patient—for the communication of a jumbled traffic. This is received, translated, and transferred back, as significance, to the patient. As Dr. Berg remarks, all depends on the analyst's comprehension of the suitable time for this. "Reason speaks and feeling bites," says Petrarch, and the biting has to be allowed a safe expression before any reason for this activity can be entertained. He is to be congratulated on his rich assortment of material and for the careful way he has translated this into terms acceptable to the public. But much is lost when he cannot use the original speech of the oral, anal, and phallic developmental levels, and also the treatment appears far more simple than in fact it is. Nothing is finally gained by hiding what is true for any level of our human culture.

Lest it should be thought that *all* conflicts necessitate complicated analyses, a reference to a remark on p. 70 is worth consideration. Dr. Berg writes, "Action seems to preclude the possibility of mind analysis." The converse is often true; and it is as well to remember that successfully induced action, acceptable to the community, often renders prolonged analysis unnecessary. Dr. Berg indicates that Medical Psychology is not blind to this fact.

JOHN MACKWOOD.

The World's Crisis and Faiths. By Baron Erik Palmstierna. (London: John Lane. 1942. Pp. 192. Price 8s. 6d.)

With the spirit of this book one cannot quarrel, and with the contents it is difficult to disagree. Indeed they are, for the most part, well-known facts concerning the teachings of the various religions of the world. The writer holds that the unity of belief which exists to no small degree about the most important elements of faith in all the great religions of mankind, should lead to a closer unity of action. He does not look for any super world-religion to replace existing religions. Indeed he thinks that what we might call the Galilean gospel—the actual teaching of Jesus as recorded in the synoptic gospels, comes as near as anything can come to being the meeting ground of spiritually minded men of all creeds, Christian or not. The author's plea is that in view of the common ground of faiths, and the world crisis, a united front of religions should be created.

If that were so, it would be all to the good. The trouble is not lack of common ground, but lack of breadth of view and good will. The largest church in Christendom still maintains its aloofness even from its fellow Christians. Sunni and Shi'a Muslims still fight in the streets. Bishops are still found to prohibit a Nonconformist from Anglican pulpits, and intercommunion appears to some of them as little short of a crime. It is this spirit which must be exorcized if there is to be any intercourse between religions. As Baron Palmstierna says: "Something is *fundamentally* wrong with our grasp on life." May it be that this is the fact that we have substituted a sense of complacency for a sense of sin? Because there was much that was artificial in the acknowledgment of sin we have made the mistake of ignoring the evil in human nature which is the root of selfishness, war and every curse which mankind brings upon itself. Every scheme for the betterment of life meets, and many are wrecked by the blind selfishness, ambition, and jealousy of men. There is the enemy, and man's future depends on the struggle with that enemy.

E. S. Waterhouse.

A Combine of Aggression: Masses, Elite, and Dictatorship in Germany. By Karl Otten. Translated by Eden Paul and F. M. Field. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1942. Pp. viii + 356. Price 15s.)

The aim of Herr Otten's book is a psychological analysis of the origin and development of the concept and the concretization of mass, particularly in Germany, but also as the nucleus of a world movement. Around this thesis he has constructed a number of hypotheses, loosely related and expressed in an amorphous, repetitive, and often obscure style. He seems unable to resist any hypothesis that enters his head, regardless of contradiction, or inapplicability to the thesis as a whole. The fact that this is a cardinal weakness of the Germanic manner, even in such giants as Kant and Hegel, hardly excuses its extreme form here. The lack of architectonic construction and of any recognizable conviction in the author, devitalizes the book. It lacks integration: it is many times too long: its chapters are vast, and its repetitions innumerable. There seems little justification for the chapter titles which seem to serve mainly as breaks in the material. Although the author is anti-Nazi, his own manner of thought appears to be somewhat akin to the mystification of Nazi ideology; yet in spite of all this, many flashes of intuition and sound common sense illumine the obscurity. In general, one may say that his treatment of fact is clearer than his ideological analysis.

Broadly the thesis is that the modern world, partly owing to the decay of Faith and partly to urbanization and mechanization, has become "massified"; that the unscrupulous forces of the elite—owners, industrialists, politicians, military chiefs, and the rest—have seized upon the mass to mould and direct it towards their will; and that the symbol of the mass, invented by the elite, is the dictator. Herr Otten argues that the whole world shows signs of this mass tendency (in one place he suggests that it may continue to spread after the war, whoever wins, though not necessarily in its worst and most aggressive form), but that Germany represents the apotheosis of the movement. He considers the sensational character of the mass-movement to derive from the misery caused by the destruction of individuality—an attempt to compensate by increasingly violent and constantly changing excitement. He regards the film industry as the microcosm of the whole modern mass-idea—a fruitful and stimulating theory which is less obscurely worked out than other parts of the book.

The origins of the mass-movement in Germany are traced partly to the Reformation, and to the effect of Luther. (Incidentally nothing is more baffling than the author's ambiguous attitude to religion—a grave defect in one criticizing a godless movement in the light of apparently "Christian" principles.) Later, the effect of the three Prussian "kings" (the Great Elector, Frederick I, and Frederick II, who are dismissed absurdly in a paragraph or two as monsters of criminal iniquity and depravity) and the growth of the Prussian General Staff is diagnosed as the origin of the modern war movement of mass-*aggression*. Herr Otten insists on the dynamic part played by the Prussian General Staff, and confirms the suspicion of many over here that Nazism is its creation and Hitler its puppet. There are some fruitful comparisons with Russia in which Marxist ideology is shown to be almost identical with that of Germany while Russian nationalism remains violently antagonistic to Teutonism. The final chapter on dictatorship is perhaps the least satisfactory. It includes the usual attempt to psychoanalyse Hitler, and, as always, gets nowhere. On the whole we learn little about dictatorship or the elite; but the book does give a powerful though blurred impression of that unique movement of our time, the mass-dynamic that E. I. Watkin has aptly called *energeticism*, i.e. movement for movement's sake; movement without *end* (in both senses of the last word); blind movement based on despair. This despair of the masses expresses itself in a craving which, in Herr Otten's words is satisfied by:

(1) Ample and cheap supplies of stimulants and tobacco.
(2) Ample and cheap films, expressing the new aesthetics of the mass, which are based upon the wishful image of the new age in the mass-mind. . . .
(3) Sports, and the opportunity for betting.
(4) Sexual pleasure, in the greatest variety, prior to and during marriage, free from all interference or restriction by judges, priests, or any authority whatsoever.

On this last point he has much to say of interest; as, for instance, that political coercion "has led the masses that live in these civilizations to regard the sexual sphere and sexual freedom as substitutes for political freedom—indeed to regard them as 'freedom' without qualification."

While agreeing with the author's main thesis, an insistent question arises: *Is this a true picture of the ordinary German?* It seems that Herr Otten is so engrossed in his theory of "massification" that he overlooks the other

elements in Germany—the great Catholic and Confessional Churches which stand as a bulwark against the regime, and the common sense of the ordinary individual that is not easily eclipsed. His book suffers from an unfortunate aspect of the "thesis" quality, best described as all-or-nothing. In their introduction the translators describe the reading of the book as "a task." Whether it is a task that can be widely recommended is doubtful.

RONERT HAMILTON.

Towards Belief in God. By H. H. FARMER, D.D. (London Student Christian Movement Press Ltd. 1942. Pp. xiv + 252. Price 8s. 6d.)

Dr. Farmer is concerned with the grounds of belief in God, and by that he means the God of Christian life and experience. He approaches the question from three sides, which he calls the coercive, pragmatic, and reflective elements of the belief. That no cogently demonstrative argument for the existence of God from other data can be adduced, he admits. "The reality of a God who is essentially will cannot be apprehended by a merely spectator attitude." But that is not the only pathway to the apprehension of truth: there are other approaches. What Dr. Farmer calls the coercive element is found in the grip of the idea in the religious experience of mankind throughout all ages and races. In passing to the pragmatic element, one is glad that Dr. Farmer gives more consideration to this aspect than do most apologists. Pragmatism is essentially the method of science, but in this country, to say the least, pragmatism has had poor consideration by philosophy. The part that God has played in the life of man is expressed by Tillotson's saying, "If God were not a necessary Being of himself, He might almost seem to be made for the use and benefit of man," or Voltaire's echo of this, "Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudriot l'inventer." It is not easy to imagine an illusion as a necessity. A scientific hypothesis accepts that which best explains the facts as an actuality, and though it is a hypothetical factor, the longer it continues to serve as the best possible explanation, the less important is the hypothetical character. The section of the reflective aspect deals with both the positive arguments and with opposing standpoints, together with a couple of chapters on freedom and evil. Dr. Farmer does not profess to read theism out of the facts of nature and history, but he contends that if we bring the thought of God to these facts, we find much to confirm and nothing to contradict it. One may describe the argument of the book as a whole as a vindication of belief in God from the facts of experience and reflection taken together. Dr. Farmer writes cogently and reasonably, and is successful in condensing all the main issues of a great matter into the comparatively short space of this book, which must be regarded as one of the most successful of its kind. It serves to show that dogmatic theism and atheism are inadequate to the complexity of the question, that no decision can be reached purely on intellectual grounds, that life as well as thought has its contribution to make to our judgment. If we add to this the admission that Dr. Farmer is scrupulously fair in controversial matters, we can commend this book as a frank, honest, and competent contribution to a great issue.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Vol. XVII. Philosophy and Order. (The Catholic University of America: Washington D.C. $2.00.)

This is a remarkable example of the vitality of Scholasticism. Even those who have not fallen into the vulgar error of dismissing the Scholastics as men who spent their time discussing how many angels could be accommodated on the point of a needle are perhaps too inclined to regard Scholasticism as outmoded. And it must be confessed that the Scholastic has not always been himself sufficiently approachable. But in this volume we see men, Scholastics to their finger-tips, yet applying their energies to the consideration of the most urgent problems of the day. Starting with a paper on "Order as a Philosophical Problem," the volume includes studies on Philosophy and Order in the chief departments of human life—psychology, social science, politics, and international relations. Brief as the papers necessarily are, they give the impression of being the work of men whose philosophical pursuits have in no way unfitted them for the handling of practical problems. It is characteristic that the volume includes an address by Mr. Walter Lippmann —a name not unknown to many in this country who would hardly have associated him with the Schoolmen—as well as a radio Symposium.

THOMAS CORBISHLEY, S.J.

Books also received:—

JOSEPH NEEDHAM, Sc.D., F.R.S. *Time: The Refreshing River.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1943. Pp. 280. 16s. net.

LEONARD HODGSON, D.D. *Towards a Christian Philosophy.* London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd. 1943. Pp. 195. 10s. 6d. net.

STANLEY COOK. *The Rebirth of Christianity.* London: Penguin Books. 1942. Pp. 218.

A. H. SMITH. *A Treatise on Knowledge.* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1943. Pp. vi + 182. 10s. 6d. net.

A. E. TAYLOR. *Aristotle.* Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1943. 3s. net. Pp. vi + 160.

ERNST KAPP. *Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. viii + 95. English price, 10s. net.

AUSTIN FARRER. *Finite and Infinite.* A Philosophical Essay. Westminster: Dacre Press. 1943. Pp. xii + 300. 20s.

JOHN MURPHY, D.Litt., D.D. *Lamps of Anthropology.* Manchester University Press. 1943. Pp. ix + 179. 7s. 6d. net.

C. E. RAVEN, D.D. *Science, Religion and the Future.* Cambridge University Press. 1943. Pp. x + 125. 7s. 6d. net.

F. ROSENTHAL and R. WALZER (ed.). *Alfarabius de Platonis Philosophia.* Vol. II of *Plato Arabus.* London: The Warburg Institute. 1943. Pp. xxii + 54. 15s.

ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. *Why Exhibit Works of Art?* London: Luzac & Co. 1943. Pp. 148. 6s.

P. A. SCHILPP (ed.). *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore.* Vol. Four in the Library of Living Philosophers. London: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xvi + 717. English price 30s. net.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE WAR

From Professor BYKHOVSKY, Moscow

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

In Volume XVI, 63, of your journal you published an article by Professor Stace, "The Philosophical Issues Involved in the War," Unfortunately, articles on pressing problems involved in the world war appear all too rarely in English philosophical periodicals. The great war of the democratic powers against the Hitler hordes has keenly raised several vitally important questions. A fight is being waged for the very existence of European civilization, for the self-preservation of culture, for the destinies of whole nations, for the future of humanity. Philosophy cannot and has no right to remain unparticipative in this mighty struggle. Self-aloofness from the fight in these days when the fate of European culture hangs in the balance would be betrayal of philosophy, betrayal of its most sanctified ideals. Being the self-cognizance of culture, the intellectual consciousness of mankind, philosophy must take its due and worthy place in the fight against Hitler barbarity and benightedness.

Professor Stace's article is one of the utterances of English philosophers spoken against the common enemy of all progressive mankind. That is why we read it with such satisfaction and brought it to the notice of Russian readers through our philosophical periodical *Pod Znamenem Marxisma* (No. 7, 1942). We would like to share with English readers some considerations on problems touched upon in Professor Stace's article.

At the beginning of his article Professor Stace raises the question as to whether the war between England and Hitler Germany really is a war between two world-views, two different philosophies, and not merely a struggle between two nations exclusively for their material concerns. And in speaking of this fight for material interests, Professor Stace identifies it with *imperialistic* war. We cannot concur with this terminology. Indeed, at the basis of *all* wars lies the collision of social-economic and material interests, but it does not follow hence that *all* wars are imperialistic. In a deeper examination of the motivating forces of social processes it will be found that behind the more abstract ideological motives of war—be they religious, ethic, or what you will—there is always concealed their real, social-economic basis, the struggle for the material interests of societies and classes. But it by no means ensues that all these wars are imperialistic.

The struggle for material interests, lying at the basis of war, determines the nature of war depending on *what* material interests are being fought for. And here one should bear in mind the fundamental distinction between *just* and *unjust* wars. *Just* wars are non-aggressive wars, they are liberative wars, pursuing the object either of defending the people against foreign invasion and attempts to enslave them or liberating people from slavery and oppression of imperialists. *Unjust* wars are wars of aggression, aiming at the seizure and enslavement of other countries, of other nations. Hitler Germany is waging a war of aggression. And the nations fighting against Hitler Germany are waging a just war, a war of liberation. As is known, in the Atlantic Charter, the nations united in the anti-Hitler coalition have proclaimed renunciation of territorial expansion as being one of their guiding principles.

All this should be borne in mind in order to distinguish between just and unjust, imperialistic and liberative wars.

True, Professor Stace writes that though war is waged for material interests, it is *also* waged for a definite world-view. Unfortunately, Professor Stace is confined with this "also," and makes no attempt to establish the *nature of correlation* between material interests and the ideologic promptings of war.

The author of the article under discussion further writes that both belligerent parties fight *not only* for their territorial interests but also for *their* world-view. But the connection between the struggle for their territorial interests and the struggle for their world-outlook by no means boils down to the fact that the one and the other are both *their own*; this connection is far deeper: world-outlook is determined

by the *character* of material interests and in turn serves as a weapon in fighting for material interests of a *defined type*. The imperialistic, plundering war being waged by Hitler Germany, and the Hitlerite "ideology" of barbarity and obscurantism are indissolubly bound up with each other not only by their appurtenance to one subject ("their own"), but also in their very *essence*. The world-outlook of Hitler Germany is just that very apology of aggression, the panegyric of international pillage, hostile, in its very roots, to universal human progress.

In the opinion of Professor Stace, the Hitlerite philosophy is formed of two elements: the Hegelian teaching of the state and Nietzschean ethics. These elements are mutually contradictory—the Hegelian teaching of the state is rationalistic through and through; the ethics ensuing from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are irrationalistic, being expressive of voluntarism.

In this enumeration of basic elements of Hitlerite ideology the eye is struck by the absence of *racism*, the zoological "philosophy of history."

In so far as the article discussed mentions Hegel as the source of the Hitlerite doctrine of the state, it should be pointed out that Hegel's philosophy as a whole by no means constitutes the source for Hitlerite ideology, not only in virtue of the former's rationalism but also because the greatest theoretic conquest of Hegel's—his dialectic method—is alien and hostile to the German obscurants: that Hegel's conservative system (of which his doctrine of the state is a component element) is in contradiction with his own method, and is a tribute to the backwardness of the Germany of his days: this system is that "dead" in his philosophy which "grips the living." The Hitlerites have availed themselves of the Hegelian cult of the state, but by this they in no way become historical inheritors of the great idealist, inasmuch as they sever themselves from the ideological traditions of classic philosophy with its deep convictions in the might of reason and enlightenment, its faith in progress, and its hatred of obscurantism.

Another component part of the Hitlerite "philosophy" is that of the doctrine of the primacy of will over reason, rooting in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In Professor Stace's opinion, Nietzsche is distinguished from Schopenhauer firstly by the fact that with the former will is identified with the "will for power," and secondly by the fact that the fight for power is recognized by him as being the motive force of progressive development. The latter aspect is not correct: Nietzsche's paeans in honour of the "will for power" are, with him, hand in hand with decisive *negation of the idea of progress*, being replaced by him with the mysticism of "perpetual returning."

The main shortcoming of Professor Stace's characterization of Hitlerite irrationalism is, we think, in the fact that the counterposing of will to reason and the subordination of reason to instinct is limited by Professor Stace to the boundaries of *ethics*. But the irrationalism of Hitlerite ideology spreads over all spheres of philosophy. The Hitlerites deny reason not only as an ethic, but also as a *gnoseologic* principle: against the doctrines of truth they counterpose *mythology*. What is more, their irrationalism grows into a negation of all European science, culture, and civilization in general, leading this negation to the herculean pillars of reaction—to the pitch of appealing for a return to the prehistoric habits of German barbarians.

In face of the whole world the Hitlerite ideologists cynically discard the integuments of civilization which hampers them. Moeller van den Bruck, for instance, one of the actual authors of that ideology which goes by the name of "Hitlerism," writes:

"The contradictions attending our history still make themselves evident. Even the oldest of them, which we had considered as having absolutely outlived themselves, are to-day again reviving. There is sense, and, what is more, political sense, in the fact that at the present time there are Germans who turn their consciousness to the former rung on the basis of which there once arose the First Reich; that there are Germans who, in the medieval ages, in the hierarchic system, and even in mystics and still earlier primitive and mythical forms, search for the new principles on which we could again base ourselves; that there are Germans who, basing themselves on the experience of our acquaintance with Western culture, civilization and progress show a preference for prehistoric and primitive cults; that there are worshippers of Donar and champions of primitive, original Christianity, and that no

formation is so sincerely loved and so understandable as the almost still barbaric formation of Romance days." (Moeller van den Bruck, *Das dritte Reich*, S. 253.)

The Hitlerites' fight against "Intellectualism" is a fight against European culture, against the very foundations of modern science and civilized life. Voluntaristic ethics are merely *one* of the elements of restoration of barbarity.

That part of Professor Stace's article in which he casts light on the connection between Hitlerite theory and practice rings well and convincing. The practical equivalent of the "theory of the total state," as correctly indicated by Mr. Stace, is a suppression of the human personality and of freedom of thought, speech, press, and public meeting. The practical equivalent of Nietzschean ethics is the striving or domination by any means, both on a national and on an international scale.

Against criminality raised to the status of "philosophy" Professor Stace contrasts the philosophy of England and other countries of democratic civilization. The two main sources of philosophy defended by the democratic countries are considered by Professor Stace to be Christian ethics and ancient Greek, in particular, Platonist life-cognizance.

Professor Stace makes the proviso that under Christianity he does not have in view here the following of Christian dogmas in the direct sense, but an ethic ideal, historically rooting in the Christian teachings of love for man, i.e. that element of European culture which is usually called *humanism*.

In speaking of Platonism Professor Stace also does not allude to the specific features of the Platonic theory of cognizance, the doctrine of the state, etc., but he avails himself of this expression conditionally—for denoting any ethic based on the primacy of reason. It is well known that English philosophic traditions are by no means Platonic. It is not Platonism but empiricism and sensualism, rooting in the teachings of the great English nominalist William of Occam and threading via F. Bacon and Locke to the philosophic teachings of Mill and Spencer, which express the national traditions of English theoretic thought. But the utilisation of the term "Platonism" accepted by Professor Stace is proper in its conditional, so to say, symbolic, sense. Professor Stace employs the conception of "Platonism" to denote the philosophic antipodes of irrationalism, and in this respect he is right.

Humanism and the primacy of reason over instinct actually are included in the guiding principles of the anti-Hitlerite world-outlook, bringing into affinity *all* freedom-loving peoples fighting against Hitlerite man-hatred and obscurantism.

Professor Stace brings out the connections existing between the principles of the world-outlook of democratic peoples and the foundations of the political pillars of democracy: respect of personal dignity, recognition of democratic liberties (thought, speech, the Press, etc.), respect for labour, condemnation of slavery.

It will not be amiss here to mention that Nietzsche, whose works the Hitlerite ideologist proclaim to be a "New Testament," openly declared that "slavery pertains to the essence of culture," and appealed for restoration of the institute of slavers. ". . . If it be true," wrote Nietzsche, "that the Greeks perished as a consequence of slavery, then it is still more true that we shall perish because of the absence of slavery." For him "labour is ignominious," and he declares that the dignity of man and the dignity of labour are "pitiable spectres" engendered in "pitiable times." And the fiercest enemies of the glorious democratic principles of European civilization rightly declare Nietzsche to be their "ideological" forerunner.

Publication of Professor Stace's interesting article in *Philosophy* is indeed a gratifying event. Professor Stace is right in pointing out that "philosophers are apt to sit in their ivory towers, weaving curious distinctions and debating strange intellectual puzzles without any consideration of their implications for humanity. For even the most abstract questions invariably have, in the end, important practical bearings." (Page 242.)

In this hour, when the destiny of European civilization, when everything which is the result of two thousand years of creative effort of progressive mankind is being decided, the dignity of philosophers compels them to active participation in this great fight for liberation.

On this ivory tower we must needs mount an anti-aircraft battery.

Yours truly,

B. Bykhovsky.

INSTITUTE NOTES

On Friday, March 19th, Professor H. Dingle lectured at the Institute on "Space and Time in Modern Physics"; while on Friday, May 21st, Mr. D. G. C. Macnabb, M.A. (Lecturer in Philosophy at Pembroke College, Oxford), delivered a lecture on "Freewill, Determinism and Rational Choice."

Notice of the Annual General Meeting will be sent to members in due course.

WAR DAMAGED LIBRARIES

As the necessity of the replenishment of stocks in European Libraries after the war will be very great, readers are invited to preserve for contribution to this object, not only numbers of Philosophy (as suggested in the April number), but any books and periodicals they can spare suitable for Universities and other educational bodies. Several schemes to this end are being formed, but in view of the war losses of so many libraries, the need can hardly be exaggerated.

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CONTENTS

PAGE

I. THE OBJECT OF OBSERVATION AND KNOWLEDGE. LAURENCE J. LAFLEUR, D.PH. 195

II. WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY: *SPACE, TIME AND THINGS.* SYDNEY E. HOOPER, M.A. 204

III. CHANCE, FREE WILL AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. HENRY A. MESS, PH.D. 231

IV. ACT AND ATTITUDE. REV. N. H. G. ROBINSON, M.A., B.D. . 240

V. THE INTERCONNECTION OF FAITH AND MORALS. REV. R. G. NORBURN, M.A., B.D. 253

VI. NEW BOOKS 265

VII. CORRESPONDENCE: THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY 285

VIII. INSTITUTE NOTES 288

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Message to Readers

As mentioned in the last number of the JOURNAL, the war with its world-wide dislocation has caused a considerable loss of income to the Institute. This loss has been accumulating for several years, and has now reached serious dimensions. The Institute has practically no endowments, and its work, including the arrangement of lectures and the conduct of the JOURNAL, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of one guinea per annum. The obvious need of the Institute in order to remedy the situation is a large increase in membership, and the Council therefore appeals to its supporters to do what they can to introduce new members, so that the benefits of the Institute may be extended to a wider circle and its revenue augmented. It also appeals for donations, small and large, from sympathisers, and suggests that those who wish to see the Institute's work flourish in the future might like to make arrangements for bequests to the Institute.

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